tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-71591569642544645542024-03-05T10:31:10.362-05:00Kennebec Captain<center> A Maritime Blog
</center>
<center>Seamanship - Principles and Practice</center>Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.comBlogger160125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-22565895580341265852022-04-12T07:22:00.001-04:002022-04-12T07:27:39.329-04:00Incident Hot Spots - From Guard P&I<p> </p><p>This is from<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15.008px;"> <a href="https://www.gard.no/web/frontpage">Guard P&I:</a></span></p><p><a href="https://www.gard.no/web/updates/content/32293819/incident-hot-spots-a-global-overview-of-navigation-incidents-">Incident hot spots - a global overview of navigation incidents</a></p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><p style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15.008px;">This is from the report:</p><blockquote style="border-left: 5px solid var(--primary-low); clear: both; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15.008px; margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 0px; padding: 12px;"><ul style="clear: both; margin-bottom: 0px !important; margin-left: 1.25em; margin-right: 0px; margin-top: 0px !important; padding: 0px 0px 0px 1.25em;"><li><span style="font-weight: bolder;">Investigating navigation incidents:</span> The majority of investigations into navigation incidents indicate “human error” as the root cause of the incident. It is seldom that an investigator tries to reconstruct the incident to fully understand the circumstances of the incident. What if all actions performed to avoid the incident were in compliance with the duties of the bridge team? What if the bridge team had performed similar manoeuvres successfully in the past to avoid the incident? <span style="font-weight: bolder;">Our investigation methods</span> could very well be as static as our approach to navigation audits and therefore <span style="font-weight: bolder;">do not consider the dynamic nature of navigating a vessel</span> through ever changing risks. As an example, when a vessel is on a tight port rotation, we recommend our members and clients consider the heightened risks of a navigation incident and advise their bridge team accordingly. Similarly, we recommend expectations to the master are managed when the vessel is likely to call a congested port or for that matter unique port where the vessel may not have called in the past. For those on shore making commercial decisions, it is important to factor in safety of navigation in the decision process.</li></ul></blockquote><p style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15.008px;">An arrival or departure at a familiar port is generally easier than calling to a port for the first time. This fact is not appreciated shore-side</p><p style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15.008px;">Another important factor not fully appreciated is the impact of a schedule change. A busy ship can not plan and execute voyage at the same time. On a high-tempo coastwise run a last minute schedule change can add significantly to the risk.</p>Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-36826669724756144732014-02-12T20:25:00.001-05:002016-01-20T19:45:32.682-05:00The Bounty, Sandy and Storm Avoidance Techniques. The NTSB Report<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh8CVW-R9hK7cKInq8ZfyREYTuQG6l1oqNXeseQfd25TYSqXMYxEZ8lwivejXi-gSKvs2FGTV3RmK5bMWzREvGQVH-ypqI6chpepuknTO3MnCW7O8r37x2x_QM138fAdvVafXKZHIiCMZQ/s1600/300px-Bounty_Greenock.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh8CVW-R9hK7cKInq8ZfyREYTuQG6l1oqNXeseQfd25TYSqXMYxEZ8lwivejXi-gSKvs2FGTV3RmK5bMWzREvGQVH-ypqI6chpepuknTO3MnCW7O8r37x2x_QM138fAdvVafXKZHIiCMZQ/s1600/300px-Bounty_Greenock.jpg" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Bounty (Wikipedia photo)</td><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><br /></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
The National Transportation Safety Board has released it's report on the sinking of the Bounty. <a href="https://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2014/MAB1403.pdf" target="_blank">(here pdf</a>). There were lots of questionable practices with regard to maintenance, training and procedures however with regards to the actual navigation in relationship to the storm there has been<b> questions about the decision to pass west of the storm.</b><a href="http://www.3dym.com/Sandy/" target="_blank"> There is a good graphic of the track of both the ship and the storm here.</a><br />
<br />
<b>Possibly the captain was using traditional low-tech hurricane avoidance techniques that were not applicable to the situation.</b><br />
<br />
From the NTSB report:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div data-angle="0" data-canvas-width="626.6880186767578" data-font-name="g_font_18_0" dir="ltr" style="font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 16px; left: 96.032px; top: 512.867px; transform-origin: 0% 0% 0px; transform: rotate(0deg) scale(0.956776, 1);">
<b> It is possible that the captain may have focused too narrowly on the position of the storm’s eye instead of on Sandy’s total expanse</b> (winds associated with the storm spanned more than 1,000 miles in diameter, and the area into which the Bounty was heading was already under tropical storm warnings, with conditions forecasted to worsen).Still, the captain seemed to believe that he could outrace the storm. </div>
</blockquote>
A traditional method of hurricane avoidance is to stay a safe distance from the eye on a track that passes the hurricane using the so-called<a href="http://www.amariner.net/cblog/index.php?/archives/9-Dangerous-vs-navigable-sides-of-a-storm.html" target="_blank"> navigable semi-circle</a>.<br />
<br />
On the navigable side,(the west side in the case of Sandy) as the storm approaches, the winds and seas will be astern (important for a square rig sailing vessel) while also pushing the vessel out of the path of the storm. Also the wind speeds are less because the winds are the cyclonic so the total wind speed is the winds minus the storm direction. On the dangerous semi-circle side (east side) the winds and sea tend to push the vessel into the path of the storm and also the cyclonic winds are added to the storm direction.<br />
<br />
It seems plausible that<b> Capt. Walbridge would have had high confidence in traditional low-tech avoidance methods.</b><br />
<br />
The problem is tha<b>t in the case of Sandy at the time of the encounter the concepts of navigable/dangerous semi-circle were invalid.</b><br />
<br />
This is because when the Bounty encountered Sandy it was transiting from a tropical cyclone(warm core) to an extratropical cyclone (cold core). The meteorology is complex but the take-away for the mariner is that the wind field will expand and the field will no longer have the same characteristics.<br />
<br />
Here is tropical cyclone Katrina:<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEioDadAG4u97aEg_u7ZCtMYLhFLDfRjZAFQWM3JOhzH6KBnKQHLmvIPix7fTZZBkm_R6ldedVuSHhQwJLdm5QfiBCxonv_1yNiSFz-PKgGei9qzHTJbW06E8qAsZn06nHL8oL-yFuvslXk/s1600/katrina_qui_2005240.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEioDadAG4u97aEg_u7ZCtMYLhFLDfRjZAFQWM3JOhzH6KBnKQHLmvIPix7fTZZBkm_R6ldedVuSHhQwJLdm5QfiBCxonv_1yNiSFz-PKgGei9qzHTJbW06E8qAsZn06nHL8oL-yFuvslXk/s1600/katrina_qui_2005240.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Katina <a href="http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=79626" target="_blank">(From NASA</a>)</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
The dark colors represent the area of highest winds. The strongest winds are NE of the center, the so-called dangerous semi-circle.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=79626" target="_blank">From NASA: </a><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Katrina was a textbook <a href="http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Hurricanes/hurricanes_1.php">tropical cyclone,</a> with a compact, symmetrical wind field that whipped around a circular low-pressure center.</blockquote>
<br />
Sandy, at about the time of the encounter on the other hand looks quite different:<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhHocWBX8CieSB0JPwN0WBFZ4m04-9hZTGfkzhS-NtlHKtIYXRKqu9DhwLEfMbV0tAEdg3PCYvGuyJNE4dRAlG6hsfnXVB616ZscvvDTnmWpHfIraOfeiJXVWWNwqpb17WLxy6auQ_qcHc/s1600/sandy_osc_2012303.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhHocWBX8CieSB0JPwN0WBFZ4m04-9hZTGfkzhS-NtlHKtIYXRKqu9DhwLEfMbV0tAEdg3PCYvGuyJNE4dRAlG6hsfnXVB616ZscvvDTnmWpHfIraOfeiJXVWWNwqpb17WLxy6auQ_qcHc/s1600/sandy_osc_2012303.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Sandy <a href="http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=79626" target="_blank">(from NASA</a>)</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
In Sandy the strongest winds are in south and west of the center and further from the center. Tragically this is where the Bounty was when it encountered Sandy.<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
So when tropical cyclones become extratropical, their wind and cloud
fields expand dramatically. Their strongest winds generally weaken
during this process, but occasionally a transitioning storm retains
hurricane force winds, as was the case with Sandy. </blockquote>
<br />
From the NHC on the 28th.<br />
<br />
<div class="bbcode_container">
<div class="bbcode_quote">
<div class="quote_container">
THE MOST RECENT AIR FORCE HURRICANE HUNTER AIRCRAFT MISSION<b> DID NOT<br />
FIND WINDS OF HURRICANE FORCE NEAR THE CENTER OF SANDY.</b><br />
HOWEVER...EARLIER DROPSONDE DATA INDICATED <b>THAT WINDS TO HURRICANE<br />
STRENGTH WERE OCCURRING WELL TO THE SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST OF THE<br />
CENTER.
</b></div>
</div>
</div>
<br />
What the Bounty encountered may have the highest wind speeds in the system. The Bounty was about 100 miles from the center in what would be considered (in a hurricane) the navigable semi-circle. What was encountered instead was not only the highest wind speeds but also the roughest seas, made short and steep by the contrary (north bound) Gulf Stream current.<br />
<br />
In spite of the complex situation the models used by meteorologist for the Sandy forecast were accurate. <a href="http://fer3.com/arc/m2.aspx/Bounty-2020-hindsight-FrankReed-nov-2012-g21189" target="_blank">There is a good discussion of the forecast here.</a> Had the captain used the<a href="http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/" target="_blank"> NHC (National Hurricane Center)</a> forecasts he may have been able to avoid the worse of the storm. Of course with few hurricane encounters under his belt the inexperienced Walbridge likely had more confidence in his own skills then the NHC forecasts. Walbridge's confidence was misplaced.<br />
<br />
A better approach is to set wind speed and/or sea height limits before the voyage and to use forecasts to ensure those limits are not exceeded. <br />
<br />
Even better then dodging bad weather of course to find a good hurricane hole, put out extra lines and stay put till the storm passes.<br />
<br />
K.C.<br />
<br />
<br />
========================================================================<br />
<br />
The NWS warns that the <a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2008/05/guidelines-for-avoiding-hurricanes-at.html" target="_blank">1-2-3 Rule</a> <b> "does not
account for the typical expansion of the wind field as a system
transitions from hurricane to extratropical gale/storm." </b> Nonetheless the rule holds up quite well.<br />
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgXyxucAD6PfAexFB_L3-jk34XrvuJvoa8Umb_F7skJy3E6yYpTu2RqQzAftsJVV43jOxBbkwyEcy_IXiHmv8UEc3l0Ah0TTZu2x664heO5zM2laCPyi6vRbQTspEnGtUHmz0qJSOH1XaY/s1600/34-kt_and_1-2-3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgXyxucAD6PfAexFB_L3-jk34XrvuJvoa8Umb_F7skJy3E6yYpTu2RqQzAftsJVV43jOxBbkwyEcy_IXiHmv8UEc3l0Ah0TTZu2x664heO5zM2laCPyi6vRbQTspEnGtUHmz0qJSOH1XaY/s1600/34-kt_and_1-2-3.jpg" width="277" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Sandy and the 1-2-3 Rule from<a href="http://davidburchnavigation.blogspot.com/2012/11/track-of-hms-bounty-and-nhc-forecasts.html" target="_blank"> David Burch Navigation</a></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
Source for the info on tropical system and extratopical is from:<a href="http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=79626" target="_blank"> Comparing the Winds of Sandy and Katria</a>Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-16601128272854932902013-08-11T22:52:00.002-04:002013-08-13T12:39:39.073-04:00Comments on the Mariners Danger Rule for Hurricane Avoidance <br />
The original 1-2-3 and 34 kt Rule at the Mariner's Weather Log<a href="http://www.vos.noaa.gov/MWL/aug1999.pdf" target="_blank"> is here (pdf file). </a><br />
<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg4I_SNTUi40QNVRV8h0XRqOquiT9DfeCPS_Kk9ueJNW2m9bRsW3-svpob20KWLTa9u2cQFYjqtkcMJ-RsBh0hdvezJlg9-pZd-Fg9Df9k4OEuvbcj7SXDWb0sVr9qCFVK1xCbKzn6c4mw/s1600-h/1-2-3+Rule.JPG" onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5197803645260765346" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg4I_SNTUi40QNVRV8h0XRqOquiT9DfeCPS_Kk9ueJNW2m9bRsW3-svpob20KWLTa9u2cQFYjqtkcMJ-RsBh0hdvezJlg9-pZd-Fg9Df9k4OEuvbcj7SXDWb0sVr9qCFVK1xCbKzn6c4mw/s400/1-2-3+Rule.JPG" style="display: block; margin: 0px auto 10px; text-align: center;" /></a>
<br />
The Mariners Danger Rule is actully two rules - The 1-2-3 Rule and the 34 kts Rule. The 34 kt Rule is the recommendation that deep-sea ocean going ships stay outside the 34 knot wind field. The 1-2-3 Rule is a method for plotting a danger area using a margin for forecast errors. The Mariners Dangers Rule allows mariners to plot the danger area based upon forecasts.<br />
<br />
Bill Bishop at The Marine Installers Rant put up an interesting post this past June -<a href="http://themarineinstallersrant.blogspot.com/2013/06/123-td-andrea.html"> 123 TD Andrea</a> about the Mariners 1-2-3 with links to the National Hurricane Center's
<a href="http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/verification/verify5.shtml">National Hurricane Center Forecast Verification </a> with some charts showing the errors in hurricane forecasts. <br />
<br />
Bill makes some good points about average errors compared to the errors in the forecasts of individual hurricanes. <br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: Georgia, Times New Roman, serif;"> The 24 hour
position forecast is pretty much on the money, the 48
hour position isn't quite as good, and at 72 hours you can see the
outliers really start to appear, and by 120 hours the
data permutations are biting hard. It's pretty much hit or miss, with a
lot of misses. The intensity forecasts that impact the size of 34 kt
wind fields are even more difficult to get right.</span><br />
<br /></blockquote>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjqTu5OC09IJoC6hWX61vrP6HLkrBFDtIpCBoVc_iO0bIK0zmZyVO5z5runPkkfSRDj6156Qet4ifvqmJBfwF8AN4jE7j7GtCZrDl1UgA8r0dTGG6XYMblFd286bytuwq0J7RLGP8500p8/s1600/ALtkerrtrd_noTD.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><br /></a></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgQNBFpXpnxZvvZ1oWOlagRW6QeenJsAkpmT7xohorIn4jpR9U5mnwlR9RhywnlZYk780VqfftYZr27a1e28RgUYUc8ymzvlDIlTZaxudLkh-8vOAUtA5XEBcurmvBldKpEYXtlWI1cVtU/s1600/ALtkerrtrd_noTD.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgQNBFpXpnxZvvZ1oWOlagRW6QeenJsAkpmT7xohorIn4jpR9U5mnwlR9RhywnlZYk780VqfftYZr27a1e28RgUYUc8ymzvlDIlTZaxudLkh-8vOAUtA5XEBcurmvBldKpEYXtlWI1cVtU/s320/ALtkerrtrd_noTD.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
Bill makes another point about being inside the 35 knot field as too much. If 35 kts is too much just adjust accordingly. However besides the issue of the accuracy and reliability of the track forecast there is the issue of the forecast wind intensity and variations in wind field size. . For me if I'm in 35 kts it is not usually an issue but if it was I'd add some distance from the system. <br />
<br />
. From the NWS:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
T<b>he 1-2-3 rule establishes a minimum recommended distance to maintain from a hurricane</b> in the Atlantic. <b>Larger
buffer zones should be established in situations with higher forecast
uncertainty, limited crew experience, decreased vessel handling, or
other factors set by the vessel master.</b> The rule does not account
for sudden & rapid intensification of hurricanes that could result
in an outward expansion of the 34 KT wind field. Also, the rule does not
account for the typical expansion of the wind field as a system
transitions from hurricane to extratropical gale/storm.</blockquote>
<br />
There is also<a href="http://www.theartofdredging.com/tcavoidance.htm" target="_blank"> a post at the Art of Dredging</a> about the 1-2-3 rule which makes remarks about the dangers of using average tracks for hurricane avoidance. That's a good point, using average tracks is a very bad idea, but I don't agree with this:<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="color: black;">The 1-2-3 system assumes that the cyclone will follow the textbooks.</span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<span style="font-family: Arial;"></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<span style="font-family: Arial;"></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="color: black;">Here is something new: tropical cyclones <i>do not read textbooks</i>.</span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<span style="font-family: Arial;"></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="color: black;">And the chances you take (by assuming that cyclones stick to the rules) are huge. </span></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0pt;">
<span style="font-family: Arial;"></span></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="color: black;">Guessing that cyclones will follow the rules is close to a game of Russian roulette.</span></span></span></div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
That's incorrect, no assumptions about cyclones following textbooks are made, the 1-2-3 Rule uses the forecast track with a margin of error. There is an important difference between the average track and the forecast track. <br />
<br />
In most cases the forecast is going to be the best information you have. Staying out of the area where the hurricane is forecast to go seems smart to me. The post mentions "modern techniques" but doesn't say what they are. <br />
<br />
This is what the original article says in the case your vessel is in the danger area:<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
when a hurricane’s track is plotted, a 100-mile error for each 24-hour period must be applied and<b> a vessel within this adjusted area must take action as if a hurricane were bearing directly toward them</b>, which may become the case </blockquote>
<br />
Forecasts are issued every six hours and the danger area can be replotted each time a forecast is received. The idea that the 1-2-3 rule uses textbook assumptions is nonsense. <br />
<br />
All rules, including the Mariners Danger Rule are simplifications of
more complex realities - knowing the rule alone may not be sufficient in
all cases. When there is any elevated risk or a complex situation I get advice from professional weather routers. Information about model agreement and confidence in the predicted track could be critical. It's all about using more expertise if required to stay safe. <br />
<br at="" avoiding="" br="" for="" guidelines="" hurricanes="" sea="" />
My post: <a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2008/05/guidelines-for-avoiding-hurricanes-at.html" target="_blank">Guidelines for Avoiding Hurricanes at Sea is here</a> and<a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2012/06/how-accurate-are-weather-forecasts.html" target="_blank"> How Accurate are Weather Forecasts? is here </a><br />
<br />
The NWS National Hurricane Center<a href="http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/prepare/marine.php" target="_blank"> Marine Safety is here. </a><br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/marinersguide.pdf" target="_blank"><img src="http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/images/pdf.png" /> Mariner's Guide For Hurricane Awareness <br />in the North Atlantic Basin</a> <br />
<br />
K.C.Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-81808183268413422352013-06-26T21:18:00.003-04:002013-06-26T22:15:35.043-04:00Twilight Mersin Turkey<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjlk9wT34NkTbB9leLhuCboNmbilSEqUHfG-TqOFN16YtsEFSUnLCWYSKFWdDn_CBA1uM3tn2inoODFZOZlbJn0VkoSwEL1c_FK_v7Am8nhRIsHiOM8LxexKQugD4RFQcyH8JR9o1qPVRA/s1600/2013-05-26++Mersin+Turkey.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="300" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjlk9wT34NkTbB9leLhuCboNmbilSEqUHfG-TqOFN16YtsEFSUnLCWYSKFWdDn_CBA1uM3tn2inoODFZOZlbJn0VkoSwEL1c_FK_v7Am8nhRIsHiOM8LxexKQugD4RFQcyH8JR9o1qPVRA/s400/2013-05-26++Mersin+Turkey.jpg" width="400" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Twilight Mersin Turkey</td></tr>
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Our stern ramp is aft on the starboard side so we don't often tie up port side to. I walked the length of the ship with my camera to record any new damage and I snapped this picture when got to the bow. (no new damage)<br />
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K.C.Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-69277347791769680382013-01-24T19:00:00.001-05:002013-01-24T19:00:22.051-05:00Accident Defense - The Costa Corcordia<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEizjjh-sPiQEN8GKk16UGIxtaMUQa-YdnbgbP0yYWtF3P24D4TKF8ZwRG5ub1GFkI4WeR50NtlWJRzhZfml-vKw5RVwfFvXeTtGkMFaOh4OB3UXpE5L6UwWxuJ4Hby9_z6Zh3DEH2_G974/s1600/Collision_of_Costa_Concordia_5_crop.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="177" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEizjjh-sPiQEN8GKk16UGIxtaMUQa-YdnbgbP0yYWtF3P24D4TKF8ZwRG5ub1GFkI4WeR50NtlWJRzhZfml-vKw5RVwfFvXeTtGkMFaOh4OB3UXpE5L6UwWxuJ4Hby9_z6Zh3DEH2_G974/s320/Collision_of_Costa_Concordia_5_crop.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Costa Concordia lays on the rocks Isola del Giglio</td></tr>
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The Costa Concordia sank about a year ago, there have been numerous reports and commentaries I thought the his one: <a href="http://www.enav-international.com/wosmedia/273/costaconcordiaanatomyofanorganisationalaccident.pdf" target="_blank">Costa Concordia Anatomy of an organizational accident </a>was interesting.<br />
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The report listed 6 errors which lead to the grounding. The errors were referred to as breaches of a defense. <b>Defenses against incidents can be compared to a defense in a game such as soccer </b> against the opposing team scoring a goal.<br />
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In the case of a soccer team the defense is also in layers.<br />
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The first layer is a good offense. If your team has possession of the ball and is in scoring position there is little chance the opposing team can score. <br />
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The second layer is keeping the opposition out of scoring position. The last layer of defense is the goalie. If at all possible the goal of the defense is to avoid allowing shots on goal.<br />
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Looking at the 6 errors;<br />
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This was where the captain allowed the opposition to have possession of the ball.<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i> The first error was made by the Captain, when he decided to change his original voyage plan without the agreement of the Company and local authorities</i></blockquote>
On the second and third errors the opposition is moving the ball down the field.<br />
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<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>The second error was a shortfall in voyage planning. According to the Safety Officer8 - who arrived on the bridge just after the impact with the rock – only the original route was drawn on the paper chart, a few miles off the island.</i></blockquote>
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<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>The third error relates to route monitoring, a specific task of the Officer Of the Watch (OOW). The bridge team was composed of a Senior OOW, a Junior OOW, a deck cadet, and a seaman with either lookout or helmsman functions. The SOOW was in charge of the conduct of navigation, with regards to conning orders, collision avoidance and route monitoring on the INS. The JOOW was assisting him fixing the ship’s position on paper charts, which has to be considered with priority over the INS route monitoring. The JOOW could not correctly monitor the approach to Giglio Island, firstly because there were no routes drawn on larger scale charts than 1:100.000, and secondly because she left the chart table to assist the helmsman when the Captain took the command of navigation</i></blockquote>
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Now the opposition is moving the ball into scoring position <br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>The fourth error also relates to route monitoring. In contrast to the third error, this involved the INS, to be officially used only as an aid to navigation. The equipment was operated by the SOOW, who used the radar distances and the electronic chart overlay to monitor the approach to the island. The error consisted in assessing the distance from the furthermost radar echo of Le Scole rocks, and not from the limit of the no-go area, that is the 10 meters bathymetric line.</i></blockquote>
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<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>The fifth error is in the area of Bridge Resource Management (BRM), and it can be attributed to the Captain, as team leader. Indeed the effectiveness of BRM practices - essentially aiming at optimizing team work – depends heavily on the leadership skills of the Captain. That night, since the Captain arrived on the bridge at about 5 miles from Giglio Island, a series of erroneous BRM practices can be extracted from the depositions. These shortfalls are of a non-technical nature, involving mainly lack of team briefing, and lack of formal handover. In short, the Captain did not share intentions and expected outcomes of the decisions made, both before and during the manoeuvre.</i></blockquote>
On the sixth and last error nothing stands between the opposition and a goal except the goalie.<br />
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<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>The sixth error is of a shiphandling nature. It was the one breaching the last available defence: the human expertise. The error consisted in failing to maintain the newly established safety margin of about 0.25 nautical miles.</i></blockquote>
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The captain worked himself into a position where he had only his shiphandling skills to prevent disaster. <br />
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A good defense in sports reduces the number of shots on goal rather then depending upon the goalie to make saves. Careful voyage planning and good bridge team management likewise reduces the number of "saves", situations which in which the crew has little room for error.<br />
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K.C.Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-9676491187635637622012-09-19T21:03:00.000-04:002012-09-19T21:05:25.733-04:00Susan Clark, Ship Captain, Pilot, Crosses Final Bar.<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhkF4QWhR208Q6s4GoACdH5kbXLNlMx60PZgi_i3SMIbS-V2w1FHIv88nMURtytm5px59QNSrjFuMkAiCud6h8fuOSJ4gIrspLzltzGuD_7TKB9Szab9pSUemVa1Km7HGB3zZcmpKlKIYw/s1600/Susan+Clark.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhkF4QWhR208Q6s4GoACdH5kbXLNlMx60PZgi_i3SMIbS-V2w1FHIv88nMURtytm5px59QNSrjFuMkAiCud6h8fuOSJ4gIrspLzltzGuD_7TKB9Szab9pSUemVa1Km7HGB3zZcmpKlKIYw/s1600/Susan+Clark.jpg" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Capt. Susan Clark (Bangor Daily News Photo)</td></tr>
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Capt. Susan J. Clark, Portland Harbor pilot passed away 6 Sept. Susan was born and raised in Skowhegan Maine, a mill town on the Kennebec River.<br />
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Susan finished first in her class at Skowhegan High School, and first at Maine Maritime. She was Exxon's first women ship captain. She Obtained her law degree and became a Portland Harbor Pilot.<br />
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Condolences to her family and friends.<br />
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<a href="http://obituaries.bangordailynews.com/obituaries/bdnmaine/obituary.aspx?n=susan-j-clark&pid=159826192#fbLoggedOut" target="_blank"> Bangor Daily News obituary here.</a><br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgYAWMswrjvt2Cn_K-1uZ4Z9-po6qYpdo5nDiyyHCJSOijsihl3TpxzpH6uOHa-XZ6bHQjecoHpB6ZWChGkfavEdoN8z8Ba2RAky2uTSeAkI88kS1NjfMwUVJj2C_qhSjvKtv5jgZyUBds/s1600/Skowtown.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="148" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgYAWMswrjvt2Cn_K-1uZ4Z9-po6qYpdo5nDiyyHCJSOijsihl3TpxzpH6uOHa-XZ6bHQjecoHpB6ZWChGkfavEdoN8z8Ba2RAky2uTSeAkI88kS1NjfMwUVJj2C_qhSjvKtv5jgZyUBds/s200/Skowtown.jpg" width="200" /> </a></td><td style="text-align: center;"></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Kennebec River at Skowhegan<br />
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K.C.</td></tr>
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Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-60402551326347763702012-09-12T21:31:00.002-04:002012-09-12T22:01:18.661-04:00Debby - When Forecasts are not Accurate<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgDDqobNjeCLABF-wHAO1lj-mUmNVWsiUzk3LKaRQcPEAotAl6hF89TtHczMK7_c1ClWlzVgP0QkxxaRg-6NuiWFCO0w858t4Cy6CWuyIe1PIdrJV0OKW6bldUb2WI5oUE9FxaZAnvExPw/s1600/td_gulf_1.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="175" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgDDqobNjeCLABF-wHAO1lj-mUmNVWsiUzk3LKaRQcPEAotAl6hF89TtHczMK7_c1ClWlzVgP0QkxxaRg-6NuiWFCO0w858t4Cy6CWuyIe1PIdrJV0OKW6bldUb2WI5oUE9FxaZAnvExPw/s320/td_gulf_1.png" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Possible paths for Debby (from <a href="http://originalweatherblog.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">The Original Weather Blog</a>)</td></tr>
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After I posted "<a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2012/06/how-accurate-are-weather-forecasts.html" target="_blank">How Accurate are Weather Forecasts?"</a> I encountered Tropical Storm Debby this past June as it formed in the Gulf of Mexico. We didn't experience much besides some rain and 25 kts or so of wind. <br />
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The interesting thing about Debby was the large error in the forecast which seems to contradict my post in which I linked to the post <a href="http://cliffmass.blogspot.com/2012/05/extraordinary-skill-for-extended.html" target="_blank">Extraordinary Skill for Extended Weather Forecasts</a> from <a href="http://cliffmass.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">Cliff Mass Weather Blog</a><br />
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This was an early forecast from the NWS: <br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEibhBVdjKElnjWH_K2rq6rQkMUFQ_U1-ZTKtf8Ki3Ou84p4HXx1RcTMSaUti2rGgLHq6UoNBreQoHYPHMWi-E-Feq1kRgigsENrNme2DB8AiP24vWJmfrwdhGFxQknZpEZER4Kj9IzWxBg/s1600/nhc_track.gif" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="256" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEibhBVdjKElnjWH_K2rq6rQkMUFQ_U1-ZTKtf8Ki3Ou84p4HXx1RcTMSaUti2rGgLHq6UoNBreQoHYPHMWi-E-Feq1kRgigsENrNme2DB8AiP24vWJmfrwdhGFxQknZpEZER4Kj9IzWxBg/s320/nhc_track.gif" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">(from <a href="http://originalweatherblog.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">The Original Weather Blog</a>)<br />
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This is a latter forecast which is much closer to the actual track.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEguGpR7Rd2heiowQs9SQ31nZ_fRkxK9X1aJx_qzeFBl5mRRIyR6i8bQunI-9rlVe1J-oli3PTtgNgmFJk3I-BjFAnGBwOYtV-RKDaWnliFzXay9n4g7Bs7b152HrQMvzsHPiowTgmgWRNQ/s1600/debby_track+2.gif" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="256" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEguGpR7Rd2heiowQs9SQ31nZ_fRkxK9X1aJx_qzeFBl5mRRIyR6i8bQunI-9rlVe1J-oli3PTtgNgmFJk3I-BjFAnGBwOYtV-RKDaWnliFzXay9n4g7Bs7b152HrQMvzsHPiowTgmgWRNQ/s320/debby_track+2.gif" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">(from <a href="http://originalweatherblog.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">The Original Weather Blog</a>)</td></tr>
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In fact forecasters were well aware of the uncertainty in the forecast, here is a chart showing what the various models were showing:<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhTH8m7cIaiGRwZcS0677GsMBV13Qs6I2iR0UTMEE874lKPZYljDRypSkWUbldPzRiC0frGZbQ6by1qOrG9M5OMSKsUYMuylHGkwXaeqpQzuUDV5zksB078I0f1A4OsYzRlb3bX3-rNYIo/s1600/debby_models.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="256" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhTH8m7cIaiGRwZcS0677GsMBV13Qs6I2iR0UTMEE874lKPZYljDRypSkWUbldPzRiC0frGZbQ6by1qOrG9M5OMSKsUYMuylHGkwXaeqpQzuUDV5zksB078I0f1A4OsYzRlb3bX3-rNYIo/s320/debby_models.png" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">(from <a href="http://originalweatherblog.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">The Original Weather Blog</a>)</td></tr>
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The question is; how does the mariner at sea know when forecasters are not confident in the forecast?<br />
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If access to the internet available mariners can dig down deeper by reading the discussion of the forecast which is available on weather web sites including the <a href="http://www.weather.gov/forecastmaps" target="_blank">NWS</a>.<br />
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Without internet access it's a little more difficult. The key is to use more then one source when available, in addition to national weather service forecasts I use a weather routing service if I am going to be in the vicinity of heavy weather. The operations department also sends additional weather if I request it. A couple of times I've had my wife email me weather info.<br />
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Don't bet too heavy using a single source. As before, with the weather forecast, trust, but verify. <br />
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K.C.<br />
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A good discussion of Debby at The Original Weather Blog here<br />
<a href="http://originalweatherblog.blogspot.com/2012_06_01_archive.html">Tropical Storm Debby Forms in the Gulf... Now What?</a>
Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-13932119036740723882012-08-21T17:39:00.000-04:002018-04-11T17:34:27.097-04:00Running the Route with the St. Louis<br />
Loading at Dundalk Terminal Baltimore the ship in front of us pulled out first, I snapped a couple photos as she slid by.<br />
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<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEijPCp9WK5mEGPjF7yCHZsIiow9oYut8NGDN07G10N_CFes3UOZHX9GWLOTUOZNvX_i_fpF6fJmibNewcWfYzJEED5Veiw5-PPQq73Q2X-gzG8bkRJ1H9LglpOrqZWhr2lUGbBU8GGmVVY/s1600/Picture+176.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEijPCp9WK5mEGPjF7yCHZsIiow9oYut8NGDN07G10N_CFes3UOZHX9GWLOTUOZNvX_i_fpF6fJmibNewcWfYzJEED5Veiw5-PPQq73Q2X-gzG8bkRJ1H9LglpOrqZWhr2lUGbBU8GGmVVY/s320/Picture+176.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">American flagged Alliance Saint Louis</td></tr>
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Here she is sliding past using two tugs. <br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgBCJ39R9KJCUNvdrnrEMmTdRw9ULOlbdwGOWZboVMW5uMNpY48xi9IWhmQ992a793dTJMKR08CTUfCtFqCqAMZp2xqKEgk2HGeCxXVZtr9aVZGBpzEt1UxdmzHkFo2TvsvvC8TDtxOEKk/s1600/Picture+177.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgBCJ39R9KJCUNvdrnrEMmTdRw9ULOlbdwGOWZboVMW5uMNpY48xi9IWhmQ992a793dTJMKR08CTUfCtFqCqAMZp2xqKEgk2HGeCxXVZtr9aVZGBpzEt1UxdmzHkFo2TvsvvC8TDtxOEKk/s320/Picture+177.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Sliding by</td></tr>
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Here is the same same ship a few days later as we are both southbound in the Gulf of Suez after leaving the canal.
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEieaihOnXPrJmbRI7nTEYxNILq80-oS82gMXO_GUfuWP6I3Tqmg1zEQGSjCw8yVbdEu3AT180lO58CSykL15XuI0ngmrbVYj8ay5erIpemA0CumciOk3Ty-P1S-ttGnS1dJZVnCwNcyS58/s1600/Picture+200.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEieaihOnXPrJmbRI7nTEYxNILq80-oS82gMXO_GUfuWP6I3Tqmg1zEQGSjCw8yVbdEu3AT180lO58CSykL15XuI0ngmrbVYj8ay5erIpemA0CumciOk3Ty-P1S-ttGnS1dJZVnCwNcyS58/s320/Picture+200.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
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It's common to see the same ship during a voyage. Often the same ships will be ahead or behind you for the entire voyage. It's like driving a bus on a bus route.<br />
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K.C.Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-75885191556443746182012-06-12T22:05:00.000-04:002012-06-13T09:16:34.955-04:00Risk Managment - Failure to Rescue<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZmZO8DdeZ9jbetVAZ_nyn5c4ACHU8qwiL5Y-BRik30sSPX9I5ss0-XXfsbDQHNf2zgQj8NdTcr6qCw3lvejAGw1fM05T5pzRsM-eBmpHWi-LSdRAeYmXlRlkWoGA9wb3Zshm-gPWO3hE/s1600/managing-the-unexpected-resilient-performance-in-an-age-of-uncertainty-21182159.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZmZO8DdeZ9jbetVAZ_nyn5c4ACHU8qwiL5Y-BRik30sSPX9I5ss0-XXfsbDQHNf2zgQj8NdTcr6qCw3lvejAGw1fM05T5pzRsM-eBmpHWi-LSdRAeYmXlRlkWoGA9wb3Zshm-gPWO3hE/s400/managing-the-unexpected-resilient-performance-in-an-age-of-uncertainty-21182159.jpeg" width="263" /></a></div>
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One of the concepts in the book Managing the Unexpected is "Weak Signals of Failure". There is a lot to this, in operations small things are always going wrong, this is the "Unexpected" in the title. Risk management is not just about reducing or avoiding risk but also having a plan for coping when things go wrong.<br />
<br />
In medicine when poor outcomes result from the failure to recognize and properly deal with weak signals of failure a term used is<b> "failure to rescue"</b><br />
<br />
From this post at <a href="http://epicureandealmaker.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">The Epicurean Dealmaker</a> - <a href="http://epicureandealmaker.blogspot.com/2012/06/50-ways-to-leave-your-lover.html" target="_blank">50 Ways to Leave Your Lover.</a>
<br />
<blockquote>
<i>The point of risk management is not to prevent failure, for that is impossible. The point is to have a plan ready to manage and control failure when it inevitably comes.</i></blockquote>
<br />
The post links to<a href="http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/06/atul-gawande-failure-and-rescue.html"> a commencement speech by Atul Gawande </a>.
The speech uses a medical example of a women who had surgery for one problem but had a second hidden, unexpected problem which was discovered by investigation of a weak signal of failure.<br />
<br />
From the speech -<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>
This may in fact be the real story of human and societal improvement. We
talk a lot about “risk management”—a nice hygienic phrase. But in the
end,<b> risk is necessary. Things can and will go wrong</b>. Yet some have a
better capacity to prepare for the possibility, to limit the damage, and
to sometimes even retrieve success from failure. </i><br />
<br />
<i>
When things go wrong, there seem to be three main pitfalls to avoid,
three ways to fail to rescue. You could choose a wrong plan, an
inadequate plan, or no plan at all. Say you’re cooking and you
inadvertently set a grease pan on fire. Throwing gasoline on the fire
would be a completely wrong plan. Trying to blow the fire out would be
inadequate. And ignoring it—“Fire? What fire?”—would be no plan at all.
</i></blockquote>
<br />
Also mentioned however was the Deepwater Horizon disaster. -
<br />
<blockquote>
<i>In the BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico two years ago, all of these elements came into play, leading to the death of eleven men and the spillage of five million barrels of oil over three months. According to the official investigation, there had been<b> early signs that the drill pipe was having problems and was improperly designed, but the companies involved did nothing.</b> Then, on the evening of April 20, 2010, during a routine test of the well, the rig crew detected a serious abnormality in the pressure in the drill pipe. They watched it and took more measurements, which revealed a number of other abnormalities that signal a “kick”—an undetected pressure buildup<b>. But it was two hours before they recognized the seriousness of the situation—two hours without a plan of action</b>.
Then, when they did recognize the trouble, they sent the flow through a piece of equipment that can’t handle such pressures. The kick escalated to a blowout, and the mud-gas mix exploded. At that point, emergency crews went into action. But for twelve minutes, no one sounded a general alarm to abandon the rig, leading directly to the loss of eleven lives in a second explosion.
</i></blockquote>
Failure to Rescue - Weak Signals of Failure, same concepts.<br />
<br />
I highly recommend Managing the Unexpected, it's a good solid book. I like being able to recognize these concepts when I run into them elsewhere.<br />
<br />
K.C.<br />
<br />
I posted about Managing the Unexpected <a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2011/02/thinking-like-mariner-managing.html">Thinking Like a Mariner - Managing the Unexpected</a><br />
<br />
and here<a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2009/02/at-sea.html" target="_blank"> At Sea</a><br />
<br />
A good review from <a href="http://blogs.hbr.org/prusak/2007/10/managing_the_unexpected_1.html" target="_blank">Harvard Business Review here. </a><br />
<br />
For terminology this is a good site (pdf) <a href="http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/accident/accident.pdf" target="_blank">Normal Accident Theory</a> from NASAKen E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-39345951870080118982012-06-03T12:31:00.002-04:002013-08-11T19:50:48.014-04:00How Accurate are Weather Forecasts?<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<br /></blockquote>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiq4wwVdhXmv7iRm2SP_JFPcMPHafIFGHSO7rvEDk0qDWO54G9FzRL14JB3M3ioAu8qMRK5EbAbYCANfnlaQCPNEDaVckAuKWT1xF4ykkj2l4XMl4nTMjA9nTg3-2oMCIgj8bzs-f-SFbQ/s1600/current++sat.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiq4wwVdhXmv7iRm2SP_JFPcMPHafIFGHSO7rvEDk0qDWO54G9FzRL14JB3M3ioAu8qMRK5EbAbYCANfnlaQCPNEDaVckAuKWT1xF4ykkj2l4XMl4nTMjA9nTg3-2oMCIgj8bzs-f-SFbQ/s320/current++sat.JPG" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><h4>
GOES Eastern US SECTOR Infrared Image</h4>
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
How much trust can a mariner
place in a weather forecast?<br />
<br />
Aboard ship this question is sometimes a matter of
considerable importance.<br />
<br />
I've
run across a couple items recently that address this question.<br />
<br />
The first is from <a href="http://cliffmass.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">Cliff Mass Weather Blog</a> - the post is<a href="http://cliffmass.blogspot.com/2012/05/extraordinary-skill-for-extended.html" target="_blank"> Extraordinary Skill for Extended Weather Forecasts</a><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">(found via <a href="http://thisisseattletraffic.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">Channel 14, Seattle Traffic</a>)</span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i> In the early days of forecasting, when our forecast models were crude
and our observational resources were few, weather prediction could not
get close to the theoretical limits. But<b> during the last decade or so,
with the availability of satellite data, fast computers, and far better
computer models, prediction skill has extended further and further out
in time.</b> In the 60s-80s we were lucky to skillfully forecast out 2-3
days. In the 90s 3-4 days. And in the 2000s, 4-5 day forecasts were
often quite skillful. But recently, we have seen highly skillful
forecasts consistently at 5-7 days, and occasionally approaching two
weeks.</i>
</blockquote>
Here is the bottom line<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<i>So when people ask you how far into the future meteorologists can predict the weather, a good answer is:</i></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<b><i>2-3 days with excellent skill</i></b></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<i>3-4 days with moderate, but useful skill</i></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<i>5-6 days with marginal skill</i></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<i>..and occasionally skill extending out 7-10 days.</i></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">
<i>Yes...sometimes forecasts go wrong in less than a day...but is considerably less frequent than a decade ago.</i></div>
<br />
<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh0Rp8JLCw2tNKXFXOUPdYHMcJTXKp8GETvMBzPnScwURryN22mTuPP4U4_QQVB1HO8y5ATqxsyVvBwqNfNHI-YLGwSR0SxEDbcLmQJioWaLuPNmHJ6-b_AuBZ2RIRG1KHdTb6X5km84r0/s1600/New-1-2-3-Rule.png" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="146" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh0Rp8JLCw2tNKXFXOUPdYHMcJTXKp8GETvMBzPnScwURryN22mTuPP4U4_QQVB1HO8y5ATqxsyVvBwqNfNHI-YLGwSR0SxEDbcLmQJioWaLuPNmHJ6-b_AuBZ2RIRG1KHdTb6X5km84r0/s200/New-1-2-3-Rule.png" width="200" /></a>The second post is from <a href="http://gcaptain.com/category/blog-3/" target="_blank">gcaptain</a> -<a href="http://gcaptain.com/mariners-1-2-3-rule-updated/?47909"> What is the Mariner’s 1-2-3 Rule and Should it Be Updated?</a> - By <a href="http://oceanweatherservices.com/blog1/author/administrator/">Fred Pickhardt</a>,<br />
<br />
I'm not going to get into details here as I've posted on the 1-2-3 Rule before here:<a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2008/05/guidelines-for-avoiding-hurricanes-at.html"> Guidelines For Avoiding Hurricanes At Sea</a><br />
<br />
Basically
the argument is that the accuracy of hurricane track forecasting has
improved and the safety margins used in the old 1-2-3 rules can, in
certain circumstance, be reduced. Better to get the info from the horse's
mouth - <a href="http://oceanweatherservices.com/blog1/2012/05/30/what-is-the-mariners-1-2-3-rule-and-should-it-be-updated/" target="_blank">Fred Pickhardt's post is here </a><br />
<br />
<br />
Aboard ship it is important to monitor the accuracy of the forecasts, We don't dispose of the weather until the voyage is completed without incident. If you check the 96hr, the 48 hr and the 24 hr forecasts against the actual weather you can develop a sense of how accurate they are.<br />
<br />
My experience is that the NWS (National Weather Service) forecasts and some other agencies are much better then many people believe but also it is easy to fall into the trap of accepting them uncritically out of habit. Much like monitoring the position of the ship to ensure it stays in safe water you should <b>check from time to time to ensure the forecast is "on track". </b>How often you check depends upon the situation.<br />
<br />
Most mariners are aware that the longer the range the forecast is the less accurate it is. The 24 hr forecast can be relied upon more then the 48 hr and so on. Beyond that my rule of thumb regarding the trustworthiness of the forecast is it depends on the issuing agency and how complex the weather situation is. Another important considerations is how much is at stake if the forecast is inaccurate.<br />
<br />
I have higher trust in forecasts from the United States, Japan and Europe then some other places. I've had the most experience in those areas and have had many opportunities to verify the forecasts. I have more trust in simple situations then complex ones, for example if there are lots of low pressure areas about I am more wary then the simpler case of a single big high pressure system.<br />
<br />
<br />
An important question is how much is at stake? If you lose the bet will it result in a delay in operations or are you risking the safety of ship and crew? In cases where you have lots of sea room it may matter little if the forecast is inaccurate as you can adjust your track as needed. On the other hand if you are coastwise or in port your options are likely far fewer. You need to think what is the worse case scenario and is a plan B practical?<br />
<br />
Plan B developed for unfavorable weather is a subject in and of itself.<br />
<br />
The bottom line is trust but verify - make sure you monitor the weather on a continuous basis, keep the latest forecast posted - the watch mates should know when the next forecast is due in. Keep the old forecasts and compare them to the actual weather.<br />
<br />
Finally, keep an eye on the barometer and the sky. - <a href="http://weather.n3ujj.com/N3UJJ_Weather_Proverbs.html" target="_blank">Look not to leeward for fine weather.</a><br />
<br />
K.C.<br />
<br />
UPDATE: I've tinkered with this post a couple of time and reserve the right to continue editing it in the future. <br />
<br />
My Post <a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2010/09/capt-mcwhirr-on-weather-routing.html" target="_blank">Capt McWhirr on Weather Routing.</a><br />
<br />
Here is a somewhat inane post from Freakonomics <a href="http://www.freakonomics.com/2008/04/21/how-valid-are-tv-weather-forecasts/">How Valid Are T.V. Weather Forecasts? </a> The conclusion is the NWS does better then the TV weather man and that short term forecasts are more accurate then long term (no surprise there)<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.marineweatherbylee.com/" target="_blank">Lee Chesneau's Marine Weather is here</a> - A few years back Lee wouldn't leave me alone until he was sure I understood a critical element of the 500 mb chartKen E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-56001034602503942502012-05-16T20:09:00.000-04:002012-05-16T22:10:54.892-04:00Book Recomend - Thinking Fast and Slow<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjaP7uBbT_ooluOJ4pB8RMrdWArdqnaHAst_WQOZfgVw3APtcgxJr1KYeZ0dul2Z1jD0UgHzxBlZ4p3cEFlgGrhQ87-bwX_McxlAqoZ4HMdgYxBMHtzkUCjOkJXEIfYM5uBi5NneWq_sYY/s1600/think+fast+and+slow.JPG" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjaP7uBbT_ooluOJ4pB8RMrdWArdqnaHAst_WQOZfgVw3APtcgxJr1KYeZ0dul2Z1jD0UgHzxBlZ4p3cEFlgGrhQ87-bwX_McxlAqoZ4HMdgYxBMHtzkUCjOkJXEIfYM5uBi5NneWq_sYY/s320/think+fast+and+slow.JPG" width="215" /></a></div>
<br />
The first GPS I ever encountered had a quirk. If it stopped receiving a signal it would, without any indication or alarm of any kind, switch over to navigation by dead reckoning. It would always give you a position that looked accurate out to three places - even if it was not receiving a signal at all. <br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.nautinst.org/en/forums/mars/mars-2012.cfm/cruiseshipgrounding" target="_blank">(The cruise ship Royal Majesty went aground for this reason</a>) <br />
<br />
Turns out, the human mind works much the same way. Here is an example from the book<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjzPe8bp9GLWrJnjc1iTiUQ_77NzPskz9k6Z4wbcp4eVQgorRkDP0WNNlNXydNs-QoTWNntK453Y4ofXMBKbigovphptMI8OTQ1ykgO0UotZMlRir2RZ7TrGeudLAsoKmsHngZFh718EUg/s1600/B-13-illusion.gif" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="66" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjzPe8bp9GLWrJnjc1iTiUQ_77NzPskz9k6Z4wbcp4eVQgorRkDP0WNNlNXydNs-QoTWNntK453Y4ofXMBKbigovphptMI8OTQ1ykgO0UotZMlRir2RZ7TrGeudLAsoKmsHngZFh718EUg/s320/B-13-illusion.gif" width="320" /></a></div>
Likely you read the left box as A B C and the right box as 12 13 14 but A 13 C or 12 B 14 would have been equally valid. Your mind resolved the ambiguity without effort but like the GPS switching to DR it did so with out notification. <br />
<br />
People have a strong bias for plausible narratives and prefer them to more probably scenario. From chapter 9:<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>A remarkable aspect of your mental life is that you are rarely stumped......The normal state of your mind is that you have intuitive feelings and opinions about almost everything that comes your way.</i></blockquote>
<br />
The mind uses a trick the author calls Substituting Questions. Rather then answer a hard question the mind substitutes a simple problems and answers that one instead. Ironically the less information we have about a question the more certain we are that we have found the correct answer.
<br />
<br />
<br />
There is far more in this book then the above. The best review I've seen is<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/books/review/thinking-fast-and-slow-by-daniel-kahneman-book-review.html?pagewanted=all" target="_blank"> this one from the New York Time Book Review. </a><br />
<br />
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thinking,_Fast_and_Slow" target="_blank">Wikipedia has a good summary here. </a><br />
<br />
Thinking Fast and Slow has five parts:<br />
<br />
Part 1 Two Systems<br />
Part 2 Heuristics and Biases<br />
Part 3 Overconfidence<br />
Part 4 Choices<br />
Part 5 Two Selves <br />
<br />
<br />
The difficulty I had with this book is it seems too long. I found parts 1 through 3 to be fascinating but started bogging down a little on parts 4 and 5. When I hit the section about <a href="http://www.epubbud.com/read.php?g=2F5L5CUD&p=37" target="_blank">Bernoulli's Errors</a> and the<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prospect_theory" target="_blank"> fourfold pattern</a> I felt the author was starting to torment me.<br />
<br />
At one point when I came to problems in the book like "Bet A 11/36 to win $160, 25/36 to lose $15 or Bet B 35/36 to win $40, 1/36 to lose $10" I had to skim, I understand that I don't understand.<br />
<br />
This problem is a little more up my alley - I got it wrong but it illustrates the point. <br />
<br />
A bat and ball cost $1.10.<br />
The bat costs one dollar more than the ball.<br />
How much does the ball cost?<br />
<br />
Most people choose 10 cents - the correct answer is 5 cents:<a href="http://www.newsminer.com/pages/full_story/push?article-Using+your+head+and+gut-+They+satisfy+different+needs+in+problem+solving%20&id=16888501&instance=com_perspectives" target="_blank"> an explanation is here.</a><br />
<div style="background-color: white; border: medium none; color: black; overflow: hidden; text-align: left; text-decoration: none;">
</div>
A point of interest to mariners was the section on feedback and practice in the chapter on Expert Intuition. The author compares driving a car which we can master quickly compared to a harbor pilot maneuvering a large ship. Ship handling takes much longer to learn because of the long delay between the action and the outcome. The quality and speed of the feedback is much better in the case of the car.<br />
<br />
I highly recommend this book if you make high-stakes decisions, every master does. I've read other books on cognitive bias and so forth but this book goes both deeper and covers more ground then any other book I've read. It is the "big picture" The going gets a bit heavy in places but overall well worth reading.<br />
<br />
K.C. <br />
<br />Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-18730206574430777062012-05-12T20:36:00.003-04:002012-05-12T21:14:04.088-04:00Reduce Work Load - Add Expertise, Not Crew<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZ-8FpIkdpPOQEaMHK0sg7fmiAN340AVXEVGILPB0UPoJCq2KtaV4Ir5xp5CDoohd-Ixwgd-XEPnSVA4KAKzAQDDdM1kdCg1kFJqZcZNt4s4fHsdD9Sp3TkF4Z2jgGOxocyxvLLt8FOgU/s1600/Shipsofficer-ww2.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgZ-8FpIkdpPOQEaMHK0sg7fmiAN340AVXEVGILPB0UPoJCq2KtaV4Ir5xp5CDoohd-Ixwgd-XEPnSVA4KAKzAQDDdM1kdCg1kFJqZcZNt4s4fHsdD9Sp3TkF4Z2jgGOxocyxvLLt8FOgU/s320/Shipsofficer-ww2.jpg" width="214" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
<br />
There is no question in my mind that many mariners are between the rock and a hard place when it comes to workload and crewing levels.<br />
<br />
Three maritime officers unions issued a statement <a href="http://gcaptain.com/u-s-maritime-unions-insufficient/?45670" target="_blank">(at gcaptain here)</a> <br />
<blockquote>
<i>Cuts in manning levels and burgeoning paperwork loads are increasing the risk of maritime accidents worldwide, says a group of U.S. maritime unions.</i></blockquote>
and
<br />
<blockquote>
<i>Maritime officers are calling on Congress to direct the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct an assessment of fatigue and crewing levels based on the recommendations of independent professionals experienced in workplace fatigue.</i></blockquote>
I don't agree that manning levels are necessarily too low.The problem is not lack of man-hours but a lack of expertise. <br />
<br />
What needs to happen is ships need more officers and fewer unlicensed. Many American ships now carry six ABs and three watchstanding officers. Three of the ABs need to upgrade to officer level.<br />
<br />
In the wheelhouse at sea the watch can be stood a single crew but usually there are two crew members, an officer who acts as mate on watch and the AB acting as helmsman / lookout.<br />
<br />
On a modern ship however a helmsman is rarely needed, sophisticated auto-pilots can be programed to turn the ship as required. Instead of an watchstanding officer and an AB the bridge team could consist of two officers, a senior officer of the watch and a junior. <br />
<br />
During times when the workload on the bridge is low, one mate could navigate and watch forward while the other mate could perform clerical work. When the work load increases both mates could cooperate using the principles of Bridge Resource Management (BRM) saving having to call the master when assistance is required. <br />
<br />
Work loads aboard ship are high and increasing, however rather then adding crew a better response is adding to the crew's capabilities.<br />
<br />
K.C. <br />
<br />
<br />Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-23321366516485047492012-04-27T10:50:00.002-04:002012-04-27T11:07:57.735-04:00Name Rectification: Monsoon<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgjimIzWSqe2awV4DwbVl5UMlXSw1XPcUNYrJhdwfOLhabaxKMufTRe6dnA9_5dUu5kCwe7qeQGgsol_g1-SmUZeetF5UIdeWGAhGm-9Ema-tg5qNvmYsLo2LGa9H-67s78RdLXlVvnZOI/s1600/6139326431_ed9403595b_b.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgjimIzWSqe2awV4DwbVl5UMlXSw1XPcUNYrJhdwfOLhabaxKMufTRe6dnA9_5dUu5kCwe7qeQGgsol_g1-SmUZeetF5UIdeWGAhGm-9Ema-tg5qNvmYsLo2LGa9H-67s78RdLXlVvnZOI/s320/6139326431_ed9403595b_b.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/44345361@N06/6139326431" target="_blank">Photo by Vinoth Chandar</a></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<br />
<br />
For navigators, the<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monsoon" target="_blank"> term Monsoon</a> refers to a seasonal wind.<br />
<br />
This usage is reflected in the roots. <a href="http://www.wordnik.com/words/monsoon" target="_blank">According to Wordnik:</a> ", monsoon comes from the Arabic word " <span class="foreign">mawsim" which means season. </span><span class="content">Obsolete Dutch <i>monssoen</i>, from Portuguese <i>monção</i>, from Arabic <i>mawsim</i>, <i>season</i>, from <i>wasama</i>, <i>to mark</i>; see <i>wsm</i> in Semitic roots."</span><br />
<br />
<span class="content">Essentially monsoons are a large scale, </span>continental<span class="content"> version of <a href="http://www.islandnet.com/%7Esee/weather/elements/seabrz.htm" target="_blank">sea and land breeze</a>s which occur on the coast. The driving force behind both monsoons and sea breezes is the different rates at which sea and land heat and cool. Land heats and cools at a faster rate then the sea. Warm air rises and is replaced by cooler air. Thus the daily (in the case of sea breezes) and seasonal (in the case of monsoons) reversals of wind direction.</span><br />
<span class="content"><br /></span><br />
<span class="content">The most well known Monsoon is the<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monsoon#South_Asian_Monsoon" target="_blank"> Indian Monsoon</a>. From May to September, the winds are SW, from sea to land. From December to February winds are NE, from land to sea.</span><br />
<span class="content"><br /></span><br />
<span class="content">The summer Monsoon famously brings moisture from the sea to the Indian sub-continent which results in (sometimes heavy) rain. This accounts for fact that the term Monsoon is often used to refer to the rainy season only (or sometime just to refer to heavy rain).</span><br />
<br />
<span class="content">For navigators, the less well know, but equally important winter Monsoon brings NE winds.</span><br />
<br />
<span class="content"> In practical terms the Monsoons influence the weather over a very large area. On a voyage from the Suez Canal to Japan,<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Sea#Wind_regime" target="_blank"> the effects of the SW monsoon are first felt in the southern Red Sea</a> but more dramatically upon leaving the Gulf of Aden and entering the Arabian sea. There, exposed to long fetch of the Indian Ocean, the SW monsoon winds sometimes result in a heavy swell. Entering the Straits of Malacca the weather is dominated by local conditions but after leaving Singapore Straits and proceeding northward in the<a href="http://www.terra-weather.com/summ_scs.html" target="_blank"> South China Sea the monsoon </a>reasserts itself. </span><br />
<span class="content"><br /></span><br />
<span class="content">The term monsoon is used to refer to any seasonal reversal of winds - here is an article about the </span><a href="http://www.wrh.noaa.gov/fgz/science/monsoon.php?wfo=fgz" target="_blank">Arizona or Mexican Monsoon</a>.<br />
<br />
<span class="content">K.C. </span>Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-72157488830993651622012-04-23T20:38:00.002-04:002012-04-23T21:23:47.286-04:00The Changing Role of the Master<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg86CxeFpoPUCmQ-jwpSrnf4LSDdGPkM7TJr_Ko7IrkHoGn8xXQxXscEOeVBRKAbvq5PX2PahU6TYkBQsqSZh5N2bESxLR1wHdTlunSs95-Qy0VcqXCJ925YwkLnaTS6qNSPk0WPC8OBkQ/s1600/800px-Romtrireme.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg86CxeFpoPUCmQ-jwpSrnf4LSDdGPkM7TJr_Ko7IrkHoGn8xXQxXscEOeVBRKAbvq5PX2PahU6TYkBQsqSZh5N2bESxLR1wHdTlunSs95-Qy0VcqXCJ925YwkLnaTS6qNSPk0WPC8OBkQ/s320/800px-Romtrireme.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Roman trireme
</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
<br />
A cargo vessel involves four interested parties, the master, the crew, the ship owner and the owner of the cargo. On the earliest commercial voyage likely all four parties were a single person.<br />
<br />
During the middle ages shipowner, master, crew and cargo owner all financed the voyage and shared the profits, if any. However the master was second in command subordinate to the shipowner. While the master had technical responsibility for the safety of the shi,p for example the selection of the route, but was often overridden by the owner seeking higher profits.<br />
<br />
As shipowners came to own more then one ship, owners began to stay ashore, sending a supercargo to sail with the vessel and handle the commercial side while the master's role expanded to include stores and hiring crews. Over time the master took over the duties of the supercargo and became the sole authority aboard ship.<br />
<br />
During the age of monarch, kings were thought to be responsible only before God. This philosophy became the basis to consider the master to be "Next to God Master of the Ship" During the 19th century as society changed the master was no longer viewed as being next to god, the last trace being in 1902.<br />
<br />
During the Golden Age of Shipping, from about 1850 to the First World War vessels remained independent of shore side control and masters enjoyed a high status. Many become wealthy shipowners themselves.<br />
<br />
After the First World War communications with vessels at sea began to improve and, as communications improved, shoreside control become possible and the master's authority diminished.<br />
<br />
Today it is questionable if the ship master has sufficient authority to operate safely given intense commercial pressure, overbearing port officials and an increasing tendency to criminalize mariners.<br />
<br />
K.C.<br />
<br />
Source: <a href="http://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/2187/1/199989.pdf" target="_blank">The Legal Position of the Ship Master </a>Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-45882117367270256972012-03-23T08:18:00.001-04:002012-04-10T22:01:43.118-04:00Costa Concordia and ECDIS<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg59EdTRgh9fjXXpabrBNGP9QsHIeyKDD0aZP2q21TBejkDMRemOuBNIkgMqBfmeZmqKmJumm_KBj6Lw4cBisNz57vpUbax2lbm7W4NMQVGo4lZjkHvIdnreYrOimKhb6WPxye7I1Ty3tE/s1600/no+go.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><br /></a></div>
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgTcI73eWsRW6Npp5B3mRRJAdvgOLYzMIvt8YwBenpeoT93p8EsQsTTaN14k71eUZqdLVeu4g-E1TltcAsv4qtVFYl5s-8mh7nXwPDmJYPOKMq7Se1_eETatBxTN-7px1hVgw_yee5uLqo/s1600/COSTA-CONCORDIA-wreck-off-Isola-del-Giglio-Photo-credit-Uaohk-GNU-Free-Documentation-License.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgTcI73eWsRW6Npp5B3mRRJAdvgOLYzMIvt8YwBenpeoT93p8EsQsTTaN14k71eUZqdLVeu4g-E1TltcAsv4qtVFYl5s-8mh7nXwPDmJYPOKMq7Se1_eETatBxTN-7px1hVgw_yee5uLqo/s320/COSTA-CONCORDIA-wreck-off-Isola-del-Giglio-Photo-credit-Uaohk-GNU-Free-Documentation-License.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">COSTA CONCORDIA wreck off Isola del Giglio, Photo credit Uaohk, GNU Free Documentation License</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
Obviously it's too early to know what happened aboard the Costa
Concordia but I wonder; were the rocks the ship struck displayed properly on the bridge navigation display?<br />
<br />
If this article from Lloyd's List <a href="http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/ship-operations/article389069.ece" target="_blank">Exclusive: Costa Concordia in previous close call</a> is accurate the Costa Concordia passed closer to shore on an earlier voyage. From the article: <br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>"intelligence tracking data </i><i>shows that Costa Concordia
sailed within 230 m of the coast of Giglio Island on a previous voyage,
slightly closer to the shore than where it subsequently hit rocks on
Friday."</i></blockquote>
The intent was to pass about 500 meters off
the rocks (which is very little margin for error at 15 kts). Evidently the ship struck the rocks because of the increased sweep path due
to the turn to starboard. Did the watch officers realize how close they were passing to the rocks?<br />
<br />
There has been reports of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_Chart_Display_and_Information_System" target="_blank">ECDIS</a> failing to show underwater hazards. From MarineLink - <br />
<a href="http://www.marinelink.com/news/displays-deliver-warned343187.aspx" target="_blank">ECDIS Users Warned Some Displays Fail to Deliver:</a><br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>Most of the remaining third<b> failed to display some significant
underwater features</b> in the "Standard" display mode. Under various
conditions, mostly related to safety depth settings and other variable
factors,<b> these underwater features can include some types of wrecks
and other obstructions. </b></i></blockquote>
Anyone who understands human nature knows many ship's officers will rely entirely upon the ECDIS display regardless of how much nagging is done not to. <br />
<br />
It remains to be seen if the ECDIS display was a factor in this incident. In any case perhaps a high profile investigation will shed some light on how poorly this critical technology is being implemented aboard ship.<br />
<br />
Clearly something is wrong if the navigation system aboard a ship fails to properly display underwater rocks, a hazard as old as seafaring itself.<br />
<br />
K.C.<br />
<br />
____________________________________________<br />
Some links:<br />
<br />
Another article on the poor implementation of ECDIS: From Marine Cafe Blog; <a href="http://marine-cafe.com/mcblog/?p=5338#more-5338" target="_blank">How to fix ECDIS: an expert’s view</a><br />
<br />
From Pear Link<a href="http://www.reidbsprague.net/1/category/ecdis%20knowledge%20deficient/1.html" target="_blank">: Bulker Grounds Crew knowledge deficient. </a><br />
<br />
With regards to the Costa Concordia Grounding: <br />
<br />
Some good graphics showing the path of the ship, also some good insights about over confidence Perspectives James Hamilton's blog: <a href="http://perspectives.mvdirona.com/2012/01/29/StudyingTheCostaConcordiaGrounding.aspx" target="_blank">Studying The Costa Concordia Grounding</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DhwW6FlL9ow" target="_blank">Costa Concordia 3D Google Earth Animation</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.klausluhta.com/cost-of-complaceny-costa-concordia/" target="_blank">The Cost of Complacency – Costa Concordia</a><a href="http://www.blogger.com/goog_1623716608"><br /></a>Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-83010255928815266322011-12-10T16:06:00.001-05:002016-02-28T10:33:01.623-05:00Comments on the Crash of Air France 447<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiXJrtL_YYW9pQqJsBNmV9KbpOZ4cOMrAd7WNzHM6KOA5j2ZYd_dI-HG3_qovvTXp39FFVdkdJ3cVlmOOwVMHPPAllyR-9lwKkrBSjUsjDvCDvcL9J7Afcw6L9wv5CThS7zYoytU9uWWxQ/s1600/Voo_Air_France_447-2006-06-14.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="142" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiXJrtL_YYW9pQqJsBNmV9KbpOZ4cOMrAd7WNzHM6KOA5j2ZYd_dI-HG3_qovvTXp39FFVdkdJ3cVlmOOwVMHPPAllyR-9lwKkrBSjUsjDvCDvcL9J7Afcw6L9wv5CThS7zYoytU9uWWxQ/s200/Voo_Air_France_447-2006-06-14.jpg" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">The Airbus's <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vertical_stabilizer" title="Vertical stabilizer">vertical stabilizer</a> recovered</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
I just read a couple of articles about the<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447"> crash of Air France 447.</a> My take, (as a mariner, I am not an aviator) is that the root cause of the crash was the failure to avoid bad weather.<br />
<br />
The first article is from Popular Mechanics: <a href="http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/aviation/crashes/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877-2#ixzz1g9qHHMmR" style="color: #003399;">Air France 447 Flight-Data Recorder Transcript - What Really Happened Aboard Air France 447 - Popular Mechanics</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
The factors which led to the crash were:<br />
<br />
- The plane encountered bad weather<br />
- An iced up pitot tubes caused a loss of aircraft speed data<br />
-With the loss of airspeed data the computer disconnected the autopilot<br />
- The controls switched modes from "normal law" to "alternate law<br />
- The junior most pilot panicked and stalled the plane.<br />
- The yoke system averaged the input from the pilots and co-pilots yoke
but without providing information that one pilot was pulling full back, this made it impossible for the captain and other co-pilot to determine the cause of the plane's behavior. <br />
<br />
Because of the unusual combination of factors above the crew flew a perfectly good, highly sophisticated plane with 228 passengers into the ocean. <br />
<br />
The second article is from BoingBoing - the post is
<a href="http://boingboing.net/2011/12/08/disaster-book-club-what-you-n.html">Disaster book club: What you need to read to understand the crash of Air France 447</a><br />
<br />
This article points out that the crash is an example the type of incident described in the book<a href="http://www.ohio.edu/people/piccard/entropy/perrow.html"> Normal Accidents by Charles Perrow</a><a href="http://www.yale.edu/sociology/faculty/pages/perrow/"><br /></a><br />
<br />
I agree the accident could be viewed as a normal accident but my take is that the error made was the simple one of failing to avoid bad weather. The root cause can be found in the very first line from the synopsis in the <a href="http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/aviation/crashes/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877">Popular Mechanics article</a>.<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
At 1h 36m, the flight enters the outer extremities of a tropical storm
system. Unlike other planes' crews flying through the region,<b> AF447's
flight crew has not changed the route to avoid the worst of the storms.</b></blockquote>
<div style="background-color: white; border: medium none; color: black; overflow: hidden; text-align: left; text-decoration: none;">
So it begins. It ends at 2h 11m when the plane hits the sea surface. </div>
<div style="background-color: white; border: medium none; color: black; overflow: hidden; text-align: left; text-decoration: none;">
<br /></div>
Had the plane flown around the bad weather, the latent conditions and the weird, unexpected failure path never would have been revealed. <br />
<br />
One other point, you can't avoid heavy weather if you don't have or don't pay attention to the forecast. Typically, shipboard the mates will simply rip what ever comes off the INMARSAT printer and, regardless of it's relevancy, post it without reading it. I don't allow that. On my ship I have a specific, written procedure that insures the correct weather forecast is read, understood and posted.<br />
<br />
Knowing the weather forecast is not just a way to avoid disaster. It also should be part of routine on a well run ship as weather impacts almost all maritime operations.<br />
<br />
K.C.<br />
<br />
<br />
Avoid heavy weather - that's a principle I've posted about twice before: <a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2010/01/parametric-rolling-of-car-carrier-in.html"> Parametric Rolling of a Car Carrier in a Head Sea </a><br />
<br />
In that post I wrote: " <br />
<blockquote>
- avoid heavy weather. Hidden flaws, the so-called<b> latent condition, ..... are more likely to reveal themselves when the ship is being tossed about in bad weather,</b> just when you can least afford to cope with it.</blockquote>
In the second post <a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2010/02/heavy-weather-encounter-satori.html">Heavy weather encounter - The Satori. </a>, I wrote:<br />
<blockquote>
<b>It is not only the vessel that encounters heavy weather, it is the vessel, crew and cargo</b>. Operating vessels, and their crews, near limits increases risks and chances of failure, - but<b> the path of failure may not be the one expected.</b></blockquote>
<br />
I've posted about normal accidents a couple of times:<a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2008/04/normal-accidents.html"> Normal Accidents</a> and here <a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2011/02/thinking-like-mariner-managing.html">"Thinking Like a Mariner - Managing the unexpected." </a><br />
<br />
<br />
<br />Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-4246797196038500162011-11-21T20:38:00.001-05:002012-04-29T12:32:12.339-04:00Reducing Information overload in heavy Ship traffic<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiBpudL7KYg1hp-MtzBtwm-0UDrmM6dBioLBT8OwQUys7X4NqhU3yPFiZM1m6IHZpfXZt-Hd8dQw6JxCdk41rZA69c_649JI_nps_8Vta-i6IVe4pHE3FWwsLzaTl58BzHGYng6rl3y-KE/s1600/ARPA.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiBpudL7KYg1hp-MtzBtwm-0UDrmM6dBioLBT8OwQUys7X4NqhU3yPFiZM1m6IHZpfXZt-Hd8dQw6JxCdk41rZA69c_649JI_nps_8Vta-i6IVe4pHE3FWwsLzaTl58BzHGYng6rl3y-KE/s1600/ARPA.jpg" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">ARPA display</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
Information overload is often a big problem for new third mates when they encounter heavy traffic. A typical difficult situation might involve two or three large ships, a few fishing boats and maybe a tug and tow all moving a different speeds<br />
<br />
<br />
Finding a solution to traffic problems can be done by the bridge watch either entirely by visual means,entirely with electronic aids such as ARPA (radar) or along the spectrum between the two. When the ship is in zero visibility there is no visual information available the bridge watch must work entirely at the radar end of the radar/visual spectrum. In clear weather an experienced deck watch officer or pilots might maneuver in traffic without the use of radar at all.<br />
<br />
Most commonly however in clear weather, in heavy traffic most bridge watch officers will find themselves relying mostly on visual information but using the radar/ARPA as an aid to verify or confirm what they see out the window. <br />
<br />
Not so however for the new third mate.<br />
<br />
From a gcaptain post <a href="http://gcaptain.com/technology-ships-dangerous-warns?33975">Technology on Ships Can be Dangerous, Warns P&I Club </a> <br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
In another case cited by the club, the OOW decided to use the Automatic
Radar Plotting Aid to track 99 different ships whilst transiting a
congested anchorage and to overlay the radar image with Automatic
Identification System data. With so much information being displayed, he
failed to notice that one of the targets had both a minimal closest
point of approach (CPA) and time to CPA and, ultimately, there was a
collision.</blockquote>
This doesn't surprise me. When a new third mate attempts to solve a difficult traffic situation, most new watch officers do not trust solutions "by eye" but prefer instead the precision provided by radar/ARPA almost as if they were in zero visibility.<br />
<br />
I've gone up to the bridge in traffic to find the mate switching from radar to radar each one with different mix of features trying to solve a problem that can be solved by a more experienced mate in just seconds by eye.<br />
<br />
In aviation new pilots must first learn to fly a plane using visual flight rules and then later gaining an instrument rating.<br />
<br />
The key to improving the ability of a new mate to deal with traffic is to<b> increase his/her confidence in solutions found by eye</b> with radar/ARPA confirmation. That sometimes means prying them away from the radar and demonstrating to them how traffic problems can be solved by looking out the window.<br />
<br />
<br />
K.C.Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-90584821378069363482011-11-18T19:18:00.001-05:002012-04-10T22:03:54.702-04:00Moneyball and Safety Management Systems<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEigiZEJvG0ldM1uXabrLjja0rq7kMgK6Jlp0Q8BYGVWGDKJEpgSNwcDaADgXOjD8Th8cz9COSM7za3BsJVF3x81-nSKDCvQnHc3kGa0E3n_hclQ_BnSx0bgMzEs09mW7bSWs-4gK96AwaI/s1600/200px-Swisher.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEigiZEJvG0ldM1uXabrLjja0rq7kMgK6Jlp0Q8BYGVWGDKJEpgSNwcDaADgXOjD8Th8cz9COSM7za3BsJVF3x81-nSKDCvQnHc3kGa0E3n_hclQ_BnSx0bgMzEs09mW7bSWs-4gK96AwaI/s1600/200px-Swisher.jpg" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Nick Swisher (from Wikipedia)</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
In this post I connect<a href="http://www.amazon.com/Moneyball-Art-Winning-Unfair-Game/dp/0393057658"> the book Moneyball </a>with shipboard<a href="http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/SafetyManagement/Pages/Default.aspx"> SMS (Safety Management Systems)</a>.<br />
<br />
Moneyball, (stealin<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moneyball">g from Wikipedia</a>) "is a book about the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oakland_Athletics" title="Oakland Athletics">Oakland Athletics</a> baseball team and its <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_manager_%28baseball%29" title="General manager (baseball)">general manager</a> <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Beane" title="Billy Beane">Billy Beane</a> The premise of the books is that the collected wisdom of baseball insiders is subjective and often flawed."<br />
<br />
The conventional wisdom was, that to win ball games you need good players, and to get good players you used traditional scouts and you paid top dollar. But, in the case of the Oakland A's, with a low budget, they couldn't pay top dollar. The key, as my old port engineer used to say is, "ya gotta be smart". Being smart in this case meant measuring the right thing, player performance and scoring metrics, the right way. To measure is to know.<br />
<br />
The link to SMS comes from a line in the book:<b> "it's looking at the process rather then the outcomes"</b>. The key to winning games was, stick with the program, follow the process. <br />
<br />
During the game, general manager Billy Beane, based on what he knew from objective measures, (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sabermetric">sabermetrics</a>), focused on the process. For instance he wanted the player at bat to get on base. The surest, safest way to get on base is to get a walk. Players on the other hand, focused on the outcome, tended to swing at pitches they shouldn't, trying for the home run.(more here <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/ft/2011/11/michael_lewis_and_billy_beane_talk_moneyball_.single.html"> Moneyball at Slate .)</a><br />
<br />
Shipboard, the process is the Safety Management System which are: "instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation
of ships" - there's more to it of course but that's the heart of it.<br />
<br />
Many mariners tend to be impatient with forms and paperwork. Often these "git er done" mariners consider SMS to have little relationship to the actual work but view it instead as a separate set of tasks that have to be done in addition to the job.<br />
<br />
That's the wrong approach. A good SMS provides the process to arrive safely at the intended outcome.<br />
<br />
This is from<a href="http://www.themaritimesite.com/"> Capt.<span class="author vcard fn">Ben Dinsmore at</span> The Maritime Site</a>, the post<a href="http://www.themaritimesite.com/increased-safety-measures-and-performance-are-not-counter-productive/"> Increased Safety Measures and Performance Are Not Counter Productive. </a><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<br />
"I believe there is a misconception in the maritime industry (or any
industrial environment for that matter) when it comes to operational
safety and performance. While most people agree that safety takes
priority EVERYTIME, there are a few people who suggest an increased
safety focus is often at the expense of performance (productivity,
downtime, etc.). This is simply not the case."</blockquote>
That's right. Stick with the program, follow the process.<br />
<br />
There is git er done and there is being safe but to do both you have to follow the process, ya gotta be smart.<br />
<br />
K.C. <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-29263659420703285392011-10-27T09:41:00.000-04:002012-04-10T22:04:23.258-04:00Vessel Encounters - The Play<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiS5yiEERNvsMNWd0U1WKz2A-AS21SgAopBZ3dIbm8l14IDfcm6gZgKe1w1OY0TAg3w-eWgqikp4NHbg1EvqpCUWxc2YMG94pDITIZix80H_h-MNdEtL4hpQEARNtOvIyjUKLru2w-us8s/s1600/power-boat-424.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="212" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiS5yiEERNvsMNWd0U1WKz2A-AS21SgAopBZ3dIbm8l14IDfcm6gZgKe1w1OY0TAg3w-eWgqikp4NHbg1EvqpCUWxc2YMG94pDITIZix80H_h-MNdEtL4hpQEARNtOvIyjUKLru2w-us8s/s320/power-boat-424.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
In comments of my post<a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2010/08/vessel-encounters-drunks-which-rule.html"> Vessel encounters drunks. Which rule applies?
</a>
I said I was going to take another stab at making my point so here goes.<br />
<br />
One of the books I have here at home is<a href="http://www.amazon.com/Mariners-Rules-Road-William-Crawford/dp/0393032876"> Mariner's Rules of the Road by William P. Crawford. </a><br />
<br />
The book uses the analogy of a play to explain the rules of conduct between vessels. From the book, regarding the rules:
<br />
<blockquote>
<i>"The structure, though, can be reduced to this: a code of conduct and a code of signals. Vessels are given a script to follow when they meet; that is the code of conduct."</i></blockquote>
and: <br />
<blockquote>
<i>The analogy of a script is apt. Performers acting out parts in a theater are guided by the playwright's specifications of who says what and when.Vessels approaching each other so as to involve risk of collision also require direction.</i>
</blockquote>
<br />
When a recreation vessel deliberately uses it's superior maneuverability to harass a larger vessel one actor is not following the script and the play is over. <br />
<br />
Searching through the rules of the roads for the appropriate rule in this case would be like searching for Booth's line "Sic semper tyrannis" in the script for Our American Cousin. It's not there, the play was over when<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Abraham_Lincoln#Booth_shoots_President_Lincoln"> Booth shot Lincoln.</a><br />
<br />
At sea, once Booth jumps onto the stage it's time for the pedantic types to turn to<a href="http://navruleshandbook.com/Rule2.html"> Rule 2</a> also called "The Rule of Good Seamanship and the General Prudential Rule.<br />
<br />
Again from Crawford's book:<br />
<blockquote>
<i>"If there is no script, or if what script exist won't work, then be ready to 'ad lib'."</i></blockquote>
<br />
K.C.<br />
<br />
<br />Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-44433937962200546222011-10-10T22:04:00.001-04:002012-04-10T22:04:44.405-04:00Use of the GPS to regain the track-line to recover a MOB<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="float: left; margin-right: 1em; text-align: left;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgcKJPv2thHuIvgDysQyxkGZNQ6CDqOPYHtvrecNo7YWqDo6Zrco7P4RY54WkYqZN1dTuWOR91zBn2b0i2GJZdBfpipoXMHs5aMxmdBB-u6_h_An3zKSEqa_EuHScPiMvHIJ6j5DDcXKmw/s1600/GPS.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="133" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgcKJPv2thHuIvgDysQyxkGZNQ6CDqOPYHtvrecNo7YWqDo6Zrco7P4RY54WkYqZN1dTuWOR91zBn2b0i2GJZdBfpipoXMHs5aMxmdBB-u6_h_An3zKSEqa_EuHScPiMvHIJ6j5DDcXKmw/s200/GPS.jpg" width="200" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Typical Maine GPS</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
In the case of a crew (man) overboard many GPS units have a MOB (man overboard) button which will give the bearing and range back to the position of the ship when the button was pushed. The problem is the button may be overlooked entirely or it may not pushed in a timely manner. Even if it is pushed in a relatively timely manner it may be difficult to determine the distance between the MOB position on the GPS and the actual position of the crew in the water.<br />
<br />
However, the crew member in the water has to be somewhere along the previous track.<b> This track information is likely stored continuously and automatically on the GPS unit. </b><br />
<br />
The GPS "PLOT", which shows the previous track, can be an invaluable aid in locating the ship's track while executing the man overboard turn.<br />
<br />
It is important to know how to switch to the PLOT screen during the overboard emergency and it is also important to check to insure that it is set up properly to continuously record the ship's track before the emergency.<br />
<br />
The ship's track may also be stored in other electronic equipment. For example "target trails" on the radar set at the appropriate time may also display the ship's previous track.<br />
<br />
<br />
K.C.Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-29948777160591283492011-10-01T21:31:00.000-04:002011-10-02T18:38:55.286-04:00Photo of Shipyard Worker Cadiz Spain<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgoueO-jNbQ72OMEIdOPE9KK2SUPmGDRCPeRMzDkYEioltos-wd57AhjTxNWh1lItAYAWHkJYYFALMfSuvcRWW3WgSnPzmRa5ABS5pzeS7Gw5lMA8nWY2Qw-75h_bWDTHm-d3PlxFXo8GE/s1600/Cadiz+Shipyard+Worker.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgoueO-jNbQ72OMEIdOPE9KK2SUPmGDRCPeRMzDkYEioltos-wd57AhjTxNWh1lItAYAWHkJYYFALMfSuvcRWW3WgSnPzmRa5ABS5pzeS7Gw5lMA8nWY2Qw-75h_bWDTHm-d3PlxFXo8GE/s320/Cadiz+Shipyard+Worker.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Cadiz shipyard worker</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
A shipyard worker standing on staging set up to work on the bow thruster.<br />
<br />
K.C. <br />
<br />
BTW I also managed to get a couple of photos of the anchor gear to tune up my post<a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2011/04/ground-tackle-details-for-pctc.html"> Ground Tackle for PCTC</a>Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-51779065358385488082011-09-21T22:01:00.000-04:002012-04-10T22:05:57.646-04:00Alaska Ranger Crew comments<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiuJGtxG1tFmt4LrASkZoQxIGq35lht0V5rZWlyBy46kCC33NJ0BXeDU-NU4FL-G1AmMOcNKxCuPB6oUGC9q8fVcry8l4oHfYTbnve6FAirQ4iwg9f_kUJmqDoYtxFDYTJb2tMCkLnaDCQ/s1600/800px-Alaska_Ranger.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="189" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiuJGtxG1tFmt4LrASkZoQxIGq35lht0V5rZWlyBy46kCC33NJ0BXeDU-NU4FL-G1AmMOcNKxCuPB6oUGC9q8fVcry8l4oHfYTbnve6FAirQ4iwg9f_kUJmqDoYtxFDYTJb2tMCkLnaDCQ/s320/800px-Alaska_Ranger.jpeg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Alaska Ranger - USCG Photo</td></tr>
</tbody></table>
Below is a comment I received on my post <a href="http://kennebeccaptain.blogspot.com/2009/12/blog-post.html"> The Alaska Ranger - shitty job, shitty boat :</a> <br />
<br />
<br />
I worked on The Ranger during 9-11. I initially was recruited and sent
to Dutch to work on a different boat for the FCA. I witnessed a attack
of a white man by three Samoans who beat this man so bad he was
transported to the hospital with 3 broken bones all in his face. I
careful exited the boat at dawn and returned to the bunks to request a
ride back to Seattle. I did approach the Captain for the boat to report
my witnessing the attack. I was told to be quiet and if I did not I
would most likely not make it back to Land once we set sail. I was
marooned in a bunk house for 12 days before a Man came to me offering a
job on a new boat "The Ranger" This man turned out to be the Captain who
was notified by the Main office in Seattle about my issue with the
abusive nature of the Deck Hands and the boo sons on the first boat. He
promised me no unfair treatment and that his boat is run by Whites and
that I would be protected because of the color of my skins. I thought
about it for a day and decided I came to Alaska to test myself, and to
go home now would only result in me looking back questioning why I
didn't try it. I spent 42 days aboard the ship, and it was by far the
hardest most grueling test of my life. We were not notified of 9-11
until early Oct and the word track the Captain used was we were at war
with Afghanistan and that they attack the pentagon. No talk of the Trade
Towers or any thing else. The Coast Guard boarded our boat before
heading back into Dutch and before hand the Captain order all of us to
throw away Beer, Pot, and Fish that we were not suppose to have cause it
was out of season. I look back now knowing that boat was the scariest
ride and realizing now that I was so close to danger makes me wonder how
many other boats out there too share the same issues..<br />
<br />
John S <br />
<br />
Thanks for the comment John S.<br />
<br />
K.C. <br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<span style="color: grey; font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-12764058683548642332011-09-10T08:55:00.000-04:002012-04-10T22:07:16.349-04:00View from My Office - Gulf of Thailand<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi_hQI3JNceassXMk7ahiTSaBXZZafZlVBrhcj9I-vRViwLdBGaFkM0x5sNbuR5bqMUbUz_95j7Fk7FVLs8jmTbxASld1QWS1oNATBBzLrPFMusaZNyNB_iEavg53nNBap0Onm_bEBxRl4/s1600/View+from+my+office.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi_hQI3JNceassXMk7ahiTSaBXZZafZlVBrhcj9I-vRViwLdBGaFkM0x5sNbuR5bqMUbUz_95j7Fk7FVLs8jmTbxASld1QWS1oNATBBzLrPFMusaZNyNB_iEavg53nNBap0Onm_bEBxRl4/s320/View+from+my+office.jpg" width="320" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Northbound - Gulf of Thailand</td><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><br /></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<br />
Singapore to Laem Chabang Thailand is about a two day run, heavy concentrations of fishing boats but traffic seems easy after transiting Malacca and Singapore Straits.<br />
<br />
K.C.Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-91832059030040570022011-07-06T21:41:00.002-04:002011-09-08T08:42:33.091-04:00Pilot Quote of the DayPilot's comment after overhearing a question from the stern while making up tugs during unmooring operations:<br />
<br />
"Whoever said there is no such thing as a stupid question never worked on a boat'<br />
<br />
K.C.Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7159156964254464554.post-25591325610482387072011-06-24T08:30:00.001-04:002012-04-10T22:08:22.392-04:00Ship Generated Current - Ship's Fast Water I snagged the Dec/Jan 2011 issue of Professional Mariner out of the officer's lounge the other day. There is an interesting article by St. Lawrence River pilot Capt. Hugues Cauvier; "Effects of the ship-generated sideways current".<br />
<br />
A ship moving sideways generates its own current. If the ship then moves ahead or astern, part of the ship remains in the current while part moves out of the current.<br />
<br />
Jerry, a tug captain I sailed with sometime ago used to describe the currents and back eddies on the Inside Passage as "fast water" and "slow water", the context being having the tug in slow water and the tow in fast water was a bad thing.<br />
<br />
A ship moving sideways generates its own "fast water" Moving then either ahead or astern is going to poke the bow or the stern into "slow water" This would cause the ship's heading to change. I have observed heading changes at slow speed which were not what I expected. This explanation seems reasonable. Next time I pull the ship out of its' own fast water I'll be watching.<br />
<br />
K.C.Ken E Beckhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14083376938841980857noreply@blogger.com1