Arming Crew - Time to trade in the Needle Gun?

Candy Ass Non-Lethal Defense Force 80 Water Cannon Found at Coming Anarchy

The Real Deal - M2 Machine Gun, Browning .50 Caliber

Many people believe that arming crews is the simple and obvious answer to the problem of piracy. I don't agree. My previous posts ( Arming Senior Offices and Arming Crew)

My crew might get arms, so I need to start planning, here is what I've come up with so far

The Nav Team
The Nav Team is already on the bridge so these guys, the two with the gray hair, they will be manning the 50 caliber machine guns on the wings. You can see my helmsman is dressed for action.


The Engine Dept.


Here some of my engine room crew, They will be manning the two machine guns on the stern. If the gun jams, you know these guy will be able clear it.



The Cook The cook will have to run into the galley from time to time to stir the soup, so she will crew the midships guns.


Kennebec Captain (QM3) fires off a few rounds - M2 Browning .50 Caliber Machine Gun (photo 1977 Aleutian Islands)

And me of course, I'll be on the flying bridge for 360 degree defense, gloriously firing away - All you folks worried about harming innocent fisherman and whining about human rights violations - look out for those spent shells!

This is all meant tongue-in-cheek of course, seriously, the best defense for one ship might not work on another, I don't pretend to know the answers myself. I have sailed with lots of good, competent professional mariners whom I would not hesitate to arm. On the other hand I've had crew I wouldn't trust with a needle gun, much less a machine gun.

K.C.

Practices to Deter Piracy on a PCTC

A PCTC in NY Harbor
With regards to piracy attacks, a PCTC (Pure Car Truck Carrier) does not fit into the most vulnerable category of ships, those with low freeboards and traveling at low speeds, the so called "low and slow". Car ships generally are capable of 18 kts or more and have high freeboards. However taking into account the consequences of a successful takeover by pirates of an American flag PCTC manned by Americans and with U.S. Government cargo aboard, standard risk assessment doctrine requires that steps be taken to mitigate that risk.

The basic philosophy of ship security is (from USCG)

“hardening” merchant shipping targets. Even if such tactics cannot entirely prevent pirate attacks, they may prolong the time it takes for pirate groups operating from small craft to gain control of a target vessel long enough for naval or law enforcement response assets in the area to successfully intervene.

The most vulnerable points can be identified by taking a walk the length of the ship while alongside, the point of view of someone trying to board from a small boat.

In the case of a car ship there are only a few vulnerable points. How these points are best defended depends upon the layout of the ship. A combination of razor wire and well directed fire hoses (lashed so that can be used unmanned) greatly adds to the challenge of boarding a PCTC at sea.

Once at sea I am guided by a publication called "Best management practices to deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia"

K.C.

Discussing Piracy Risk of PCTCs.

A PCTC Alongsside

Risk Assessment consists of an objective evaluation of risk in which assumptions and uncertainties are clearly considered and presented. (Wikipedia) (FAA Risk Assessment here)

I have talked to many people with regard to what the level of risk is involved in a transit of a car ship (PCTC) through the Gulf of Aden and what countermeasures are appropriate. What I have learned is that this is an emotional issue for many people and each persons views seem more related to that persons political outlook and personality then practicality and that the passion with which the views are held and how vigorously they express those view is not related to that persons level of expertise.

I am not just talking about laymen, the views of ship's captains are all over the map as well. My view is that the risk should be evaluated the same as other risks the ship must contend with such as fire, collision, grounding, labor troubles, weather and so on. (and on and on)

In the case of a piracy attack on a PCTC running at full speed I believe we are dealing with a risk with a large potential loss and a low probability of occurring. Appropriate countermeasures should be evaluated using cost and benefits analysis. Issues with regards to the use of deadly force and the use of lethal vs non-lethal weapons should be resolved at company level and shipboard discussions are generally not worthwhile nor are they particularly enlightening.

When I encounter a person who knows very little about the reality of the situation, assumes that I have no understanding and is determined to educate me, I change the subject and offer them a cup of coffee




K.C.

Escorts for Group Transits

When I think convoy, the picture below is what comes to mind:

WWI Convoy However if you are transiting the Gulf of Aden using the Group Transit system what you see might look more like this:

Group Transit Escort (Photo by KC) Go ahead, zoom in, ain't nothing there.

Whats the deal? According to The Journal of Commerce article Facing Down Piracy:

The group transits,.......... are like convoys but are not escorted by naval ships, which remain “out of sight” over the horizon but still “handy” enough to reach the groups when the pirates hail them.

Ok, "out of sight" but "handy", fair enough, you can't see any ships but you know they are there, just out of sight. But here's the thing, how do I know someone is there?

During my transits of the Gulf of Aden I receive no information at all regarding military assets available for protection. In fact the response I get to my numerous reports is ....NOTHING, not even so much as an automatically generated email, something along the lines of "your call is important to us", I mean nothing, not a single message or email even acknowledging that I exist, let alone that I am transiting the GoA.

I am required to send in numerous messages and reports when I transit, expected arrival times at various points, 24 hr AMVER reports, 8 hr position reports to UKMTO, report to MARAD, noon reports to various parties with ETAs and ETDs to various points, time to enter IRTC (International Recognized Transit Corridor) time to leave, lists of intended waypoints, list of port calls with estimated arrival and departure times. I have to make various initial reports, updates, noon positions and final reports.

I find myself transiting the Gulf of Aden wondering if any one is even receiving my reports, let alone reading them.

It is discouraging to expend time and energy sorting though the voluminous memos, reports, navigation warnings and instructions in order to correctly (I hope) send the proper reports at the correct time and not receive any feedback. I am sometimes tempted to stop sending the required reports to see if I get a reaction.

In more practical terms, an important factor in my planned response to an attack is the expected response time for assistance. If I only need to hold out 30 minutes my response would differ if I need to hold our for a couple of hours or more. Expected response time at any given time during the transit or even in which direction from which I can expect help is something I would like to know. I often don't know if I am even within VHF range of assistance.

K.C.

Ship's Crew repels boarders

Crewman from Zhenhua 4 prepares Molotov cocktails (CCTV) found at Modern Day Pirate Tales


From Modern Day Pirate Tales:

"Yesterday saw a dramatic incident in the Gulf of Aden, during which a Chinese vessel was boarded by at least seven pirates pirates. But rather than surrender to the attackers, the crew of the Zhenhua 4 barricaded themselves inside their vessel and used whatever they could find to fend off the pirates during the five-hour ordeal."

Read the rest here "Pirates and Peace Keepers"


Fred Fry had this covered at On Defending Unarmed Merchant Ships Against Pirates

K.C.

Biscaglia and the use of LRADs

It seems that the vessel Biscaglia which was seized by pirates on 28 Nov while transiting the Gulf of Aden was using a LRAD.

Wikipedia seems to have some good info on the vessel Biscaglia and on the company hired to protect it APMSS (Anti Piracy Maritime Security Solutions).

K.C.

The (Unarmed) Defense of the Biscaglia

Bob Couttie has the details on the hijacking of the Biscaglia
Fourth Time Unlucky for Shipboard Security Team

"Reports remain confused however we believe that the embarked 3 man APMSS security team, comprising former British military servicemen, were able to mount sustained, non-lethal, resistance, denying the attacker’s access to the ship long enough for the ship’s operating crew to seek safety below decks and to summon assistance from coalition warships."

Sounds like this was a textbook response to an attack and yet the pirates were able to seize the vessel

I can anticipate what the armchair gunners response to this incident is going to be - the British guards should have been armed. A couple of weeks ago I would have agreed. Now I am not so sure.

A lot of people dismiss the argument that it is unwise to arm merchant ships and mariners, the argument being that doing so will simply raise the level of violence.

I think it would be wise to give some though as to whether or not we want to increase the volume, velocity and weight of flying projectiles around my ship and crew in hopes of mitigating the pirate problem.

K.C.

Pirates promise to catch ship "next time"

"we heard over the MMF/SSB Radio a call directed at our ship saying; “Bateau Canadian,Bateau Canadian, you were lucky this time sir, but not the next time,we promise you this."

The article is Captain Derek Kruger Experience while passing Somalia Coast - at Seafarerblog.com