For navigators, the term Monsoon refers to a seasonal wind.
This usage is reflected in the roots. According to Wordnik: ", monsoon comes from the Arabic word " mawsim" which means season. Obsolete Dutch monssoen, from Portuguese monção, from Arabic mawsim, season, from wasama, to mark; see wsm in Semitic roots."
Essentially monsoons are a large scale, continental version of sea and land breezes which occur on the coast. The driving force behind both monsoons and sea breezes is the different rates at which sea and land heat and cool. Land heats and cools at a faster rate then the sea. Warm air rises and is replaced by cooler air. Thus the daily (in the case of sea breezes) and seasonal (in the case of monsoons) reversals of wind direction.
The most well known Monsoon is the Indian Monsoon. From May to September, the winds are SW, from sea to land. From December to February winds are NE, from land to sea.
The summer Monsoon famously brings moisture from the sea to the Indian sub-continent which results in (sometimes heavy) rain. This accounts for fact that the term Monsoon is often used to refer to the rainy season only (or sometime just to refer to heavy rain).
For navigators, the less well know, but equally important winter Monsoon brings NE winds.
In practical terms the Monsoons influence the weather over a very large area. On a voyage from the Suez Canal to Japan, the effects of the SW monsoon are first felt in the southern Red Sea but more dramatically upon leaving the Gulf of Aden and entering the Arabian sea. There, exposed to long fetch of the Indian Ocean, the SW monsoon winds sometimes result in a heavy swell. Entering the Straits of Malacca the weather is dominated by local conditions but after leaving Singapore Straits and proceeding northward in the South China Sea the monsoon reasserts itself.
The term monsoon is used to refer to any seasonal reversal of winds - here is an article about the Arizona or Mexican Monsoon.
Information overload is often a big problem for new third mates when they encounter heavy traffic. A typical difficult situation might involve two or three large ships, a few fishing boats and maybe a tug and tow all moving a different speeds
Finding a solution to traffic problems can be done by the bridge watch either entirely by visual means,entirely with electronic aids such as ARPA (radar) or along the spectrum between the two. When the ship is in zero visibility there is no visual information available the bridge watch must work entirely at the radar end of the radar/visual spectrum. In clear weather an experienced deck watch officer or pilots might maneuver in traffic without the use of radar at all.
Most commonly however in clear weather, in heavy traffic most bridge watch officers will find themselves relying mostly on visual information but using the radar/ARPA as an aid to verify or confirm what they see out the window.
In another case cited by the club, the OOW decided to use the Automatic
Radar Plotting Aid to track 99 different ships whilst transiting a
congested anchorage and to overlay the radar image with Automatic
Identification System data. With so much information being displayed, he
failed to notice that one of the targets had both a minimal closest
point of approach (CPA) and time to CPA and, ultimately, there was a
collision.
This doesn't surprise me. When a new third mate attempts to solve a difficult traffic situation, most new watch officers do not trust solutions "by eye" but prefer instead the precision provided by radar/ARPA almost as if they were in zero visibility.
I've gone up to the bridge in traffic to find the mate switching from radar to radar each one with different mix of features trying to solve a problem that can be solved by a more experienced mate in just seconds by eye.
In aviation new pilots must first learn to fly a plane using visual flight rules and then later gaining an instrument rating.
The key to improving the ability of a new mate to deal with traffic is to increase his/her confidence in solutions found by eye with radar/ARPA confirmation. That sometimes means prying them away from the radar and demonstrating to them how traffic problems can be solved by looking out the window.
The Coast Guard report on the grounding on the tug Pathfinder on Bligh Reef prompts the Old Salt Blog to point out that this is the same reef struck by the Exxon Valdez on March 24, 1989.
As pointed out, both incidents have in common Bligh Reef and human error. They also both share a lack of a proper navigation plot.
1. At 2324 Exxon Valdez drops off the pilot
2. At 2330 Hazelwood changes course to 200T
3. At 2339 Third mate Cousins plots a fix / Hazelwood changes course to 180 T (due south)
4.At 2353 Hazelwood leaves the bridge, orders third mate Cousins to change course when abeam Busby Light (2 minutes ahead)
5. At 2355 Third mate Cousins plots a fix abeam Busby but does not change course.
6.At 2400 (midnight) Lookout reports Bligh Reef on the Stbd bow - Cousins orders Right 10 rudder
7. At 0004 Cousins orders right 20 rudder
8. 0007 Cousins orders hard right
9. Exxon Valdez strikes Bligh Reef at 12 kts.(at 12 kts 1 mile = 5 minutes)
The key here is that giving verbal instructions to the mate does not suffice. It's critical that an intended track-line be laid down with anticipated turning times labeled on the chart. When a navigator plots positions, courses and times on a chart it moves navigational information from the officer's mind, to the paper chart where it can be more easily examined by all involved. Plotting navigation information is both a way to determine turning times, distances to hazards and so forth but also, importantly, it is also a communication tool.
When Capt Hazelwood ordered Cousins to "turn when abeam Busby Island" we don't know if Hazelwood had full situational awareness, specifically the ship's position and distance from hazards and we don't know how Cousins interpret his instructions. Placing the relevant plotting information on the chart would have closed understanding gaps between mate and captain.
The captain of a tugboat that ripped open on Prince William Sound's Bligh Reef in 2009 was unaware of the boat's position when he put it on a crash course with the infamous and well-known navigational hazard, according to a Coast Guard report.
"Unaware of the boat's position". My experience is that captains and mates on tugs don't keep a paper plot. In many cases they should. If the crew is so familiar with the area that they fully aware of the vessels position at all time, for example in a marked river channel, then a full plot is not necessary. In many other cases some form of a plot should be kept. According to Bowditch
"a small craft navigator of limited experience may underestimate the importance of professional navigation. However his vessel's safety depends on his skill. He must plan his track and know his position at all times. Small craft navigation also requires a complete, accurate, and neat plot."
But the captain on the Pathfinder had over thirty years of experience including ten years on the Pathfinder. Not a navigator of "limited experience". This is an example of what a ship mate of mine describes as "I'm so good I'm brain dead"
For captains this is simple, insist on a formal plot. For mates it's a little tougher. I've sailed on tugs where the captain forbid making marks of any kind on the chart. But if allowed don't accept "hand waving" when changing watch. If the off-going officer does not have a plot take the time to lay one down before you relieve.
A ship's anchor relies upon the weight of the anchor chain (also called cable) to keep the forces acting on the anchor horizontal as much as possible. If the chain, at the anchor, is lifted 15 degrees it is estimated the anchor loses about half it's holding power. Insufficient scope increases the risk of dragging anchor. Excess scope on the other hand increase the risk of damaging or breaking the chain.
When the amount of scope required is determined, the distance between the end of the hawsepipe and the water is usually taken into account but for convenience the mate usually reports the amount of chain at the waters edge - for example the bow might report "6 shots in the water'. It also can be (usually when heaving in) reported by how much is on deck.
Many references recommend a scope of between 5 and 7 (of chain) to 1 (water depth)
"The minimum scope of mild steel cable to use according to depths of water is given by the following rough guide:"
Below 20 m 6 to 8
20 m to 40 m 4 to 6
over 40 m less then 4
A ship may be required to anchor in as much as 100 meters of water (for example Fujairah Anchorage) with 10 shots of chain out the scope is less then 3 to 1.
Ultimately the master must determine how much scope to use based upon his experience.
A few details about the ground tackle of a 6500 unit PCTC (Pure Car Truck Carrier or informally a car carrier) - a 200 meter ship
On all ships the term ground tackle refers to a vessel's anchors, chain and windlass.
The anchor: The anchor type is AC-14 The weight is about 8 tons
AC-14 Anchor
The chain: The chain consist of links, the type of link is called stud link, the size, which is the diameter of the wire used to form the links is 81mm. The length of an anchor chain is measured in shots. One shot is 15 fathoms or 90 feet (27.4 meters).
Ship's anchor chain ranged out onto the drydock
The port anchor chain is 11 shots - 990 feet or about 300 meters - total weight is 44 tons.
The starboard anchor is 10 shots - 900 feet or about 274 meters - total weight is 40 tons.
The weight of a 81mm diameter chain is 0.144 tons/meter - the weight of each shot therefore is 4 tons.
Each shot is connected by a connecting link.
Connecting Link
The connection between the chain and the anchor includes a swivel, an end link and a bending shackle
The windlass: There are two separate, hydraulically powered windlass, one for each side, the windlass is capable of recovering the chain at a rate of about 1 shot (90 feet) in three minutes.
Professional Mariner Magazine reports that an 85 kt gust of wind pushed a Carnival Cruise Ship off the pier where it was moored. No surprise there. The standard mooring arrangement isn't going to hold a ship with that much sail area alongside in 85 kts .What caught my eye was this:
"The company said the anchor retrieval equipment malfunctioned after the incident."
I don't know what happened to the anchor gear, no details are provided. (It's standard practice to let go an anchor or two in this type of situation) My guess is at some point during the excitement the anchor gear took a very heavy strain and damaged the anchor windlass. My experience has been that the windlass will fail before the chain or anchor will. A heavy strain on an anchor windlass can bend the main shaft, or twist the winch so that the main gears are misaligned.
If you are using your anchor gear to hold the ship off the rocks it's a good thing if the chain or anchor doesn't fail. If the windlass fails you'll likely still be able veer more chain or hold what you've got.
One thing is, after the yelling dies down and you want to get out of Dodge you're going to have to recover your anchor and chain without the windlass.
Both the Coast Guard and the NTSB have now released their reports on the sinking of the Alaska Ranger. The Coast Guard's report can be found at the CG site Homeport - type "Alaska Ranger" into the search box to find the report. The NTSB's report can be found here.
The Alaska Ranger case is not complex. The hull of the vessel was in such poor condition that, in typical Bering Sea conditions, water entered and flooded the entire vessel. The actual point of failure evidently was the Kort nozzles which were tacked onto the vessel in 1991.
The Coast Guard report claims that there was ambiguity in regulations regarding the Ranger status as a fishing vessel or a processor. Thirty-two of the forty-nine people aboard the Ranger were titled "Factory Processors", that makes it a processor.
The Coast Guard created a loophole in the law called the Alternate Compliance Program which according to the Coast Guard
"allows exemptions to the class and Load Line requirements while at the same time creating improved safety requirements for these vessels, thereby avoiding the incentive to operate strictly as uninspected fishing vessels. ACSA vessel owners work with the Coast Guard"
In effect the Coast Guard put it's stamp of approval on a vessel which was not seaworthy but which carried thirty non-mariners onto the 32 degree waters of the Bering Sea.
This is a case of risk assessment, scrapping the Alaska Ranger would have risked adversely impacting the owner's bottom line.
Controlling the rate of turn while steering a ship is somewhat analogous to controlling the speed of a car.
If we name certain settings of the car throttle as follows: idle, slow, moderate in the analogy they match up to rudder angles, amidships and say 5 and 10 degrees of rudder. Using the car's brakes is similar to using counter rudder, that is rudder in the direction opposite the turn.
Note that cars speed is analogous to the ship's rate of turn, not it's speed.
M/V Snowbird Alongside Dutch Harbor (1985) (Photo by K.C. )
I went to work on the Snowbird as mate in February of 1985. We had a crew of six, Captain, mate, Chief Eng, 1 A/E, a deck hand and a cook. We ran from Seattle to Alaska.calling ports in Southeast and Southwest Alaska. My previous post on the Snowbird is here
Ship's cook and deckhand shove pallets around on Deck(Photo by K.C. )
The cargo holds of the Snowbird were insulated and refrigerated. During cargo operations the crew, sometimes with the aid of a couple of guys from the cannery, would move the frozen boxes of seafood, usually crab from Trident Seafoods, and stack it by hand in the holds. It took about two days working all night to load the ship. The holds were kept at about -25F.
View from the port wing - The Fork Lift is used in the hold(Photo by K.C. )
The Snowbird often made up alongside a vessel at anchor. Here the whip from the Snowbird's outboard boom is married to the outboard whip from the bigger freighter. I never heard this set-up called anything but "Jap Style".
M/V Snowbird Alongside a Reefer Freighter (Photo by K.C. )
The two boxes aft are reefers and are used for cargo. They are loaded by dropping loaded pallets aft of the boxes and moving the boxes of seafood into the reefer boxes by hand.
M/V Snowbird Alongside view from the Freighter (Photo by K.C. )
Not much to the wheelhouse, besides throttle and rudder control we had a compass, one radar, a couple VHF a HF/MF radio
Last time I saw the Chief he was making and selling Pal Oil
Al, The Chief, in the Wheelhouse (Photo by K.C. )
I sailed with Doug for two years and learned more about seamanship, navigation and ship handling in that time then any other time in my career prior to sailing master myself.
Captain Doug(Photo by K.C. )
Every voyage involved navigating the Inside Passage then heading across the Gulf of Alaska, needless to say the sailing wasn't always smooth, especially in the winter.
Headed HomePhoto by K.C. )
Working on the Snowbird involved almost no paperwork, no safety management system, but plenty of long hours at low pay in less the ideal conditions
If you have ever had a "what was I thinking" moment after an incident or near incident it is likely you have been the victim of cognitive bias. If you have to make operational decisions, understanding how to avoid bias could be critical.
An inbound pure car and truck carrier (PCTC) was approaching the pilot station at her scheduled time, in very confined waters. A gale warning was in force and with only two miles to go to the pilot embarkation point, the wind suddenly increased and pilotage services were abruptly suspended.
The master was instructed to await further orders and decided to head back to open waters rather than wait in the confined area or anchor there. The wind caught the beam of the high-freeboard and low draught vessel, and started setting her on to the lee shore, less than two miles downwind. Using full rudder and engine power, and transmitting appropriate signals on the air horn and VHF radio, the master just managed to turn the ship’s head into the wind and execute the 180-degree turn and head out to open sea.
Once out of the lee of the land, the full force of the gale caused the ship to move sideways at about five knots, even with the engine going on harbour full ahead. The vessel remained stubbornly beam on to the wind despite all attempts to heave to with the head into the sea and swell. This type of vessel has been rightly described as a ‘ping-pong ball on the water’ and under high wind conditions, ro-ros are almost impossible to control or manoeuvre.
At the first indication of approaching strong winds, masters of ro-ros and similar high-sided vessels must not hesitate to leave port or confined waters and anchorages and head out to open sea. Maintaining a safe position under way in the lee of a high offshore island is a safe option, provided the location and predicted movement of the weather system is known.
If sailing from port is not possible, ships have been kept alongside with continuous use of tugs, and, in uncrowded anchorages, mooring to two bower anchors may considered, but with engines in full readiness until the wind has abated.
Even with full scope of chain on both anchors, ro-ro vessels tend to yaw violently in strong winds and the ‘jerk’ at the extremity of each yaw may cause the anchors to drag, especially if the holding ground is less than ideal.
Mariners whose vessels may be navigating or lying at anchor near a ro-ro vessel in high winds, must allow for a greater margin of safety.
a short masted, heavy displacement rig. She weighs 11 tons and is designed for heavy seas. Eleven stays keep the forty foot mast secure. When the boat was built Ray requested heavy rigging to be certain that Satori could handle more severe storms.
When the owner and captain of the Satori, Ray Leonard, hove to in 40 kt winds and 30 ft seas he felt confident that his vessel was well within its limits but was unexpectedly forced to abandon his vessel. Leonard's confidence in his vessel was not misplaced, the Satori was later recovered with little damage. The path of failure was not the vessel but the crew: From the story: He (the captain) was unable to convince the crew that this motion was uncomfortable but not dangerous.
This second knockdown put the crew into a heightened state of panic. They began to insist that they call the Coast Guard for a rescue. Karen believed that the boat was going to break up any minute. The captain explained that there was no need for a rescue and that Satori had been through this before and would ride out this storm. At this point, Susan and Karen were not listening and kept insisting that they wanted to call. Ray agreed to let them call,
The Coast Guard required Capt Leonard to abandon his vessel and sent a HH-3F helicopter from Elizabeth City, N.C. Rescue swimmer Dave Moore went into the 30 ft seas and pulled the captain and two crew out of the water.
It is not only the vessel that encounters heavy weather, it is the vessel, crew and cargo. Operating vessels, and their crews, near limits increases risks and chances of failure, - but the path of failure may not be the one expected.
A 200 meter long PCTC upbound Westerschelde River (photo by K.C.)
Under certain conditions a large car ship in head seas may experience sudden, unexpected, heavy rolling, a phenomena know as parametric rolling.
I have experienced this type of rolling myself while hove to aboard a 200 meter ( 656 ft) long PCTC (Pure Car Truck Carrier) in 10 meter seas
On the 10th of March, 2008. (satellite data here) enroute from the English Channel to the Straits of Gibraltar, about 60 miles SW of Cape Finisterre, we experienced about four hours of high wind and seas starting about noon on the 10th. When the weather first began to deteriorated at about 0800 (8 a.m.) I began continuously and gradually reducing speed. The seas continued to become higher and closer together and finally, around noon, in 65 + knots of wind and with seas 10 -14 meters (33 - 46 feet), to minimize ship motion I turned the ship into the seas, and reduced engine speed to bare minimum revolutions required to maintain heading.
At noon, in spite of the huge seas, the ship seemed under control, by adjusting the engine speed between slow and half ahead we were able to maintain steerage and avoid pounding, the ship was pitching heavily but without too much drama.
After about 20 minutes of successfully encountering these huge seas the ship was climbing up the face of one of the bigger seas, perhaps 12 meters, when suddenly and without warning the ship took a sharp, deep, heart stopping roll to starboard. This was followed by the same amplitude roll to port and again to starboard. On the third roll the main engine lost lube oil suction and the automation shut down the engine due to low oil pressure.
With the engine stopped the high winds caused the heading to fall off and drifting rapidly (about 6 knots sideways) downwind, we experienced heavy rolling in beam seas but nothing as bad as the three big rolls experienced with head seas. Once main engine power was restored I again turned the ship into the sea and again experienced a series of quick, heavy rolls and for the second time the main engine cut out.
After the second experience of heavy rolling while encountering head seas I gave up on the idea of maintaining a heading into the sea and instead experimented with different tactics, settling upon running dead slow with the seas more of less on the starboard beam with the wheel hard over to starboard, turning up more into the sea when encountering the biggest seas by increasing engine speed and reducing revolutions, allowing the heading to fall off and slowing the ship during the smaller sets.
Over the next four hour the seas gradually diminished and by about 1600 (4pm) we began to increase speed and a couple of hours later we were on our way at close to full speed.
The ship suffered no damage with the exception of a parted wire on the starboard accommodation ladder, there was no cargo damage. However likely not all the cargo would stayed lashed in place had the rolling lasted much longer. Even with a crew continually tightening lashings some of the lashing on the cargo was starting to loosen.
Luckily we escaped with minimum damage, it could have been much worse.
Lessons:
Lesson learned - avoid heavy weather. Hidden flaws, the so-called latent condition, in this case a hull shape with a propensity to roll in certain head sea conditions, are more likely to reveal themselves when the ship is being tossed about in bad weather, just when you can least afford to cope with it.
In February 2003, the Wallenius PCTC M/V Aida experienced sudden violent rolling in rough head sea southwest of the Azores. Roll angles as large as 50 degrees were read off the bridge inclinometer. When this incident was post-analysed it was found that the conditions, in terms of the relation of wave encounter period and natural roll period, were such that parametric rolling was the most likely cause.
The fact that inclining at reduced stability alternates with righting at increased stability can only lead to excitation of roll if this alternation is repeated regularly and sufficiently often. This is only possible at parametric resonance, when the period of encounter approximately equals or is approximately half the effective roll period
A Coast Guard Inspector from Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara looks over the damage after the Freighter Otello allided with a pier at Port Hueneme, Calif. (USCG Photo)
I wasn't there when the car ship Otello hit the pier in Port Hueneme but I bet I know what the both the pilot and captain were doing moments before the starboard quarter of the ship struck the pier. They were both watching the bow.
What happens is this, the pilot and captain intently peer over the wing watching the bow, the pilot controlling two tugs and the main engine, the rudder, and the thruster, The pilot, his focus forward, having forgotten his last command to the aft tug to push and the captain, not fully trusting that the pilot can cope with the bow closing too fast, watches forward as well. Meanwhile, 180 meters aft, the stern swings into the pier.
The root cause of this incident, all the mooring expertise is focused upon what apparently is the problem, the bow closing on the pier. It is my experience that often a glance aft or a word from the captain will remind the pilot to have a look back and give the aft tug the proper command.
Pilot and captain should cooperate during mooring operations for optimum results.
The determination of risk of collision is a basic navigational skill. Equally basic at sea is situational awareness and the ability to keep track of dozens of vessels in congested waters, including oftentimes numerous fishing vessels and to interpret information, all in real time. This is bread and butter stuff; a watchkeeper who cannot master this, and be right all the time, is simply unfit to keep independent watch.
It is therefore dismaying that this basic skill is found wanting in more than a few navigating officers at sea today.
a surprising lack of confidence in modern lifeboats which is causing some reluctance on the part of ship crews to conduct the necessary lifeboat drills intended to help them protect their lives
It may have been surprising in 1994, today it's not just mariners who lack confidence, the IMO, because of concerns with the number of mariners killed and injured during lifeboat drills, amended SOLAS effective July 2006 so that it is no longer required that the crew be aboard during launching.
This has observers tsk-tsking and decrying the decline of seamanship and training of today's crews. For example the the New Zealand branch of The Nautical Institute is worried that:
The crew are no longer able to practice using the tricing pendants to bring the lifeboat alongside the embarkation deck; or release the pendants to clear the ship's side before lowering into the water.
I think that amount of training crews receive in the use of tricing pedants is adequate given that tricing pendants are not used on a modern enclosed lifeboat.
The photos below, from the Northeast Maritime Institute, a facility which provides training to meet Coast Guard and SOLAS requirements for proficiency in survival craft, shows an crew being trained in an obsolete open lifeboat
The first photo shows the boat in the stowed position. The span wire is equipped with manropes, these are for the crew to hold in case the lifeboat drops, modern enclosed lifeboats do not have manropes.
Next, here is a photo which shows an open lifeboat that has been lowered to the embarkation deck. The boat is held at three points, from left to right, first the falls, the double set of wires which can be seen running from the sheave at the ends of the davit, the falls raise and lower the boat, next the tricing pendant, just inboard of the falls, this pulls the boat alongside so the crew can board. They will be released before the boat is lowered (the boat must be raised to release weight first) and the frapping lines which run horizontally to a cleat on the davits, these help control the swing of the boat.
I received my lifeboat endorsement at NMI myself, I am confident that if I find myself on a sinking WWII Liberty ship my crew ( say for example we get torpedoed by a U-Boat) and I will have a good chance to successfully launching the lifeboats.
Unlike the open boat on which the crew receives training, the modern fully enclosed lifeboat there are no tricing pedants, no frapping lines, no manropes. The crew boards the lifeboat in the stowed position. The gripes and davit locking pins) are removed, then the crew simply lifts the brake and down she goes. At least in principle, in practice it is a different matter.
For example in the video below a lifeboat launch the boat starts down, stops, then resumes it descent. As can be seen this causes the lifeboat to swing energetically.
-Do not stop the swinging out operation at deck position. Stopping shakes the lifeboat and may cause casualties. - A rapid swing out may cause dangerous impact on the boat when the davit arm reaches the deck position. - Inching operation shakes the lifeboat and is dangerous.
On ships I sailed on lowering the boat in accordance with the instructions, neither too fast nor too slow, requires a deft touch on the brake.
In the video the person at the brake starts out at full speed, which the IMO tells us: "may cause dangerous impact." Then the operator tries to slow down which the IMO says "is dangerous" but ends up stopping instead which causes the boat to swing.
The modern enclosed lifeboat and davits is an attempt to idiot proof the launching system. these systems have problems which can be partly mitigated with training.
As for critics who claim that the mariners reluctance to trust modern lifeboats shows a lack of seamanship, I say, have the critics keelhauled.
Dictator in tow by the U.S. Coast Guard—U.S COAST GUARD
In the article Quick Thinking Saves Dictator After Collision at Sea fishing boat captain Rick Curtis, regarding the ship which struck and nearly sank his boat, is quoted as saying "There are supposed to be three guys in the wheelhouse of that ship. And they didn’t see me?”
Capt Curtis supposes or imagines three people in the wheelhouse of the ship which struck his boat. Going a step further, here is what I think a fishing boat crew imagines regarding the watch on the container ship contrasted with what I imagine the wheelhouse of that container ship might really been like.
The fishing boat crew imagines the lookout is well rested and is watching forward, constantly scanning the horizon and will have no problem seeing a 70 foot fishing boat.
I imagine the lookout, if there is one, having worked overtime that morning is nearing the end of his watch and weary of watching forward, he instead has become mesmerized by ship's motion and is daydreaming, seeing nothing past the rolling, pitching rows of containers in front of him.
The fishing boat crew imagines that the mate is competent, motivated, rested and alert, has full situational awareness and has no other duties other then maintain a good watch.
I imagine that the mate, on the mid-watch, is fatigued, he has spend the last hour and a half weaving though fishing vessels in poor visibility while also encountering other large ship traffic. The numerous fishing vessels, most of which do not have proper lookouts, alter course suddenly and without warning, unaware of the presence of the larger, faster vessels.
The crew of the fishing vessel imagines the captain to be at the radar, which is on the optimum range for detection of fishing vessels and that the gain, sea return and rain clutter are all properly adjusted. Furthermore the fishing boat crew imagines that there are no other large vessel about and that their vessel is the only one of concern.
I imagine the captain is in his office. His ship is approaching the United States, the country which has perhaps the most complex entrance requirements and the most draconian penalties for non-compliance . In addition to pre-arrival requirements the captain has payroll, stores and parts orders and so forth.
In general, it is accepted practice to assume that the watch on another vessel is alert and competent, at least to a point. What that point is depends upon the circumstance of course but when the point of "in extremis" is reached both vessels have an obligation to take action. Before that point however it is prudent to call on the VHF and verify that the watch on the other vessel is aware of your presence.
(a) A speed that you can stop in half the visible distance you can see, so you can maneuver out of danger in the other half (if the visibility is zero, then minimum speed that you can keep your course.
That's what is known as the half-distance rule. Even my outdated edition of Farwell's acknowledges this rule is out of date. According to my sixth edition (1985) recent court rulings have allowed higher speeds but "not more then a knot or two"
We all know that hardly any master will reduce speed in bad visibility nowadays. Instead radars and other electronic equipment are relied upon
and
We have experienced a tremendous technological development during the past 30 – 40 years while the rules have been static, in fact the present rules on speed in restricted visibility are based on the 1897 rules. And they do not recognise radars as a reliable instrument. This is in contradiction to how radars are viewed in other industries i.e. aviation and military and indeed to actual practise by the maritime community as well.
Why are mariners faced with this dilemma, that normal practices would be found in violation of the rules in the event of an incident?
The article argues that the rules need to be updated and quotes from Charles Perrow's Normal Accidents:
The navigation rules have developed to aid the courts in finding fault rather than aiding the ships in avoiding accidents
The author, Tor Lund, argues that:
Instead of taking any proactive efforts, administrations seems to be reactive; merely sending out occasional “notices” telling mariners to strictly follow the rules although they know that these notices will not be followed. This behaviour is contrary to what can be seen in other modes of transportation i.e. road, rail and air where authorities as well as other interested parties are proactive in order to constantly improve their systems and rules.
I agree, my derriere is hanging out too far already, time for an update taking into account such things as radar, AIS, VHF and VTS and other modern aids.
Rudder damage to Southwest Harbor scalloper Dictator. Laurie Schrieber photo
On some ships if you walk onto the bridge at near the end of the watch there is a good chance you will find the mate bent over the chart table writing up his log while the lookout is busy making a pot of coffee. Not my ship of course, but the point is this: don't bet your life upon the fact that a big ship doing 20+ knots is keeping a good lookout.
Consider the story of the fishing vessel Dictator which was fishing for scallops with about 50 other boats in heavy rain and fog, visibility of only about a half-mile The story is here from Fishermans Voice Container Ship Hits Fishing Boat by Laurie Schreiber
The wheelhouse watch never saw the ship coming until it was almost on top of them:
All I saw was this great, big, huge ship going down the side of us,” he said. “Water was coming over the stern from his wake, and he squirted us out from under his bow.”
I don't know what was happening on the bridge of the container ship, the watch might not have been paying attention or they may have lost the return from the Dictator in the sea clutter, or it might have been time to put on a fresh pot of coffee. Either way the crew of the Dictator was placing their lives in the hands of the watch aboard another vessel.
AIS (Automatic Identification System) may have prevented this incident. Had the Dictator been transmitting an AIS signal it may have been seen aboard the container ship. That solution however still relies upon the vigilance of another vessel. One possible solution might be a receive only AIS. The devices are inexpensive, there is a good article at Boating SF - Get AIS Ship Tracking on your boat.
Don't bet that yours is the only vessel not keeping a proper lookout.
Look out the window. That's my message to new third mates. More then that, gain experience in the interpretation of what you are seeing.
I honestly don't understand why almost all new third mates have such a strong preference for using the radar when the situation can be more easily understood visually.
In aviation new pilots must first learn to fly a plane using visual flight rules and then later gaining an instrument rating. New mates on the other hand seem bound and determined to navigate entirely by instruments. My message to them is the same one I gave the mate that night in Alaska - Look out the [expletive deleted] window.
