Rules for Vessel in Fog. Out of Date?

What is a safe speed in restricted visibility?

According to this site - MCA orals the answer is:

(a) A speed that you can stop in half the visible distance you can see, so you can maneuver out of danger in the other half (if the visibility is zero, then minimum speed that you can keep your course.

That's what is known as the half-distance rule. Even my outdated edition of Farwell's acknowledges this rule is out of date. According to my sixth edition (1985) recent court rulings have allowed higher speeds but "not more then a knot or two"

However this article, Safe Speed in a Fog; Ancient Rules in a Modern Age (PDF) says what most mariners know to be true:

We all know that hardly any master will reduce speed in bad visibility nowadays. Instead radars and other electronic equipment are relied upon

and

We have experienced a tremendous technological development during the past 30 – 40 years while the rules have been static, in fact the present rules on speed in restricted visibility are based on the 1897 rules. And they do not recognise radars as a reliable instrument. This is in contradiction to how radars are viewed in other industries i.e. aviation and military and indeed to actual practise by the maritime community as well.

Why are mariners faced with this dilemma, that normal practices would be found in violation of the rules in the event of an incident?

The article argues that the rules need to be updated and quotes from Charles Perrow's Normal Accidents:

The navigation rules have developed to aid the courts in finding fault rather than aiding the ships in avoiding accidents

The author, Tor Lund, argues that:

Instead of taking any proactive efforts, administrations seems to be reactive; merely sending out occasional “notices” telling mariners to strictly follow the rules although they know that these notices will not be followed. This behaviour is contrary to what can be seen in other modes of transportation i.e. road, rail and air where authorities as well as other interested parties are proactive in order to constantly improve their systems and rules.

I agree, my derriere is hanging out too far already, time for an update taking into account such things as radar, AIS, VHF and VTS and other modern aids.

K.C.

AIS and the Nautical Rules of the Road

Photo by Ulf Larsen, on the bridge of the Norwegian coastal vessel MF Bastø II. (found on Wikipedia)

At the Navigation Electronic site PANBO, in the comment threat of this post Class B rollout, looking better, but mysterious the question came up: How is AIS (Automatic Identification System) being integrated into the Nautical rules of the road.

I think both rule 5 and 7 apply.


Rule 5 of the nautical rules of the road reads as follows:

Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.

From Handbook of the Nautial Rules of the Road" Llana & Wisneskey"

Fortunately, mechanical means for maintaining a lookout are available. "Available" to Rule 5 means "shall be used" in appropriate circumstances. Some of these "other means" are listed below:

• Binoculars
• Radar
• VHF bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone
• Automated radar plotting aids (sometimes called collision avoidance radar)
• Differential GPS (DGPS) satellite navigation equipment
• Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) radio transponders
• Vessel traffic services
• Navigation and piloting instruments

Rule 7 is

Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. If there is any doubt, such risk shall be deemed to exist.

The same argument used in rule 5 hold true in rule 7, AIS is a tool that can be used to determine if risk of collision exists.

An important point here is both rules begin the same way: "Every vessel"

K.C.

F/V Dictator Incident a case for receive-only AIS?

Rudder damage to Southwest Harbor scalloper Dictator. Laurie Schrieber photo
On some ships if you walk onto the bridge at near the end of the watch there is a good chance you will find the mate bent over the chart table writing up his log while the lookout is busy making a pot of coffee. Not my ship of course, but the point is this: don't bet your life upon the fact that a big ship doing 20+ knots is keeping a good lookout.

Consider the story of the fishing vessel Dictator which was fishing for scallops with about 50 other boats in heavy rain and fog, visibility of only about a half-mile The story is here from Fishermans Voice Container Ship Hits Fishing Boat by Laurie Schreiber

The wheelhouse watch never saw the ship coming until it was almost on top of them:

All I saw was this great, big, huge ship going down the side of us,” he said. “Water was coming over the stern from his wake, and he squirted us out from under his bow.”

I don't know what was happening on the bridge of the container ship, the watch might not have been paying attention or they may have lost the return from the Dictator in the sea clutter, or it might have been time to put on a fresh pot of coffee. Either way the crew of the Dictator was placing their lives in the hands of the watch aboard another vessel.

AIS (Automatic Identification System) may have prevented this incident. Had the Dictator been transmitting an AIS signal it may have been seen aboard the container ship. That solution however still relies upon the vigilance of another vessel. One possible solution might be a receive only AIS. The devices are inexpensive, there is a good article at Boating SF - Get AIS Ship Tracking on your boat.

Don't bet that yours is the only vessel not keeping a proper lookout.

K.C.

Capt. "Ardover" Gregory-Smith

Capt. Gregory-Smith's ship the HMS Eridge - Hunt Class Destroyer (Type II) (Photo from Wikipedia)

At Old Salt Blog I saw this story: Captain Frank Gregory-Smith: Destroyer Captain and D-Day Beachmaster'

If Capt Gregory-Smith had been a fictional character the story would strain credulity that one man could have so often been in the thick of it.

The captain's obituary, here, in the Telegraph

But at heart he was always a destroyer man and it was as such, as the captain of HMS Eridge, that he fought through 1941 and 1942 in the bitter struggle between the Royal Navy and Axis forces for control of the Mediterranean. In this theatre he served at the Battle of Sirte, sank a U-boat, sailed in four Malta convoys and numerous Tobruk convoys.

He was know as Capt Ardover "for his frequent use of full rudder."

K.C.

Incident Reports Point to Lack of BRM

From BIMCO A cautionary fishy tale

The Master had a largely unblemished record, with his performance rated by an internal audit undertaken three years before the incident as “outstanding”, while he was personally commended for his “leadership and dedication to detail”.

The "incident" was running down a navigation tower.

The risk of poor communications among a bridge team creating the potential for incidents has long been recognised and paved the way for the introduction of Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training, now a familiar part of company training programmes.

If the power of BRM has long been recognized, it has not been fully embraced by ship masters and pilots.

If the concerns about BRMs shortcomings are valid then it seems we should be seeing accidents reports where too much teamwork was a factor in an accident. I think it is possible that too much of available resources on the bridge are being used to coordinate and communicate and so forth but I haven't seen any reports of that being the case yet.

K.C.

Embarked Security Teams - Supplement or Supplant?

There is a fundamental misunderstanding regarding the role private security teams aboard ship. This article, Private Security Counters Pirates, is a good illustrations of these misunderstanding.

The role of private security teams is not to provide security, but to increase the level of security by supplementing the security all ready in place.

A ship at sea already has in place a chain of command, clearly defined responsibilities and duties, a trained crew, a watch schedule and a emergency response plan. The embarked security team must fit within this structure, not act independently from it.

The master of any ship which embarks a security team must ensure that an embarked security team team fully understands exactly what their role is aboard ship. Any action taken by the security team must be in accordance with the ship's security plan and be approved by the master. This is especially true in the case of a decision to use lethal force. Actions taken by the security team are just as much the responsibility of the master as actions taken by the ship's regular crew.

K.C.

Cosco Busan NTBS Report - Master / Pilot Exchange

Cosco Busan, anchored after striking the Oakland Bay Bridge

Back in February Bob Couttie posted NTSB on Cosco Busan: Unfit, Ineffective, Incompetent.

In its determination of probable cause, the Safety Board cited three factors: 1) the pilot’s degraded cognitive performance due to his use of impairing prescription medications; 2) the lack of a comprehensive pre-departure master/pilot exchange and a lack of effective communication
between the pilot and the master during the short voyage; and 3) the master’s ineffective oversight of the pilot’s performance and the vessel’s progress.

Bob updated in May when the NTSB released it final report with Communication, Cosco Busan And Sex With A Duck

>Pilot: [unintelligible] you said this was the center of the bridge.
Master: Yes.
Pilot: No, this is the center. That’s the tower. This is the tower. That’s why we hit it. I thought that was the center.
Master: It’s a buoy. [unintelligible] the chart.
Pilot: Yeah, see. No, this is the tower. I asked you if that was [unintelligible]. . .

Basically the finding are that the pilot was impaired and that the master failed to properly monitor the vessel progress, In other words the pilot conned the ship into the bridge tower while the master and bridge crew stood by and did nothing.


The degree to which the pilot is willing to cooperate with the master varies a great deal. In Japanese ports, for example, the pilots come aboard with a form which includes the intended track of the vessel including the approach, in other ports, some pilots view the master's questions as a nuisance. In the U.S. it could go either way depending upon the port and the individual pilot.

Update: This is what I'm talking about.

From the Site The Pilot Boat example of what I would consider an excellent passage plan.
K.C.

Arming Crew - Time to trade in the Needle Gun?

Candy Ass Non-Lethal Defense Force 80 Water Cannon Found at Coming Anarchy

The Real Deal - M2 Machine Gun, Browning .50 Caliber

Many people believe that arming crews is the simple and obvious answer to the problem of piracy. I don't agree. My previous posts ( Arming Senior Offices and Arming Crew)

My crew might get arms, so I need to start planning, here is what I've come up with so far

The Nav Team
The Nav Team is already on the bridge so these guys, the two with the gray hair, they will be manning the 50 caliber machine guns on the wings. You can see my helmsman is dressed for action.


The Engine Dept.


Here some of my engine room crew, They will be manning the two machine guns on the stern. If the gun jams, you know these guy will be able clear it.



The Cook The cook will have to run into the galley from time to time to stir the soup, so she will crew the midships guns.


Kennebec Captain (QM3) fires off a few rounds - M2 Browning .50 Caliber Machine Gun (photo 1977 Aleutian Islands)

And me of course, I'll be on the flying bridge for 360 degree defense, gloriously firing away - All you folks worried about harming innocent fisherman and whining about human rights violations - look out for those spent shells!

This is all meant tongue-in-cheek of course, seriously, the best defense for one ship might not work on another, I don't pretend to know the answers myself. I have sailed with lots of good, competent professional mariners whom I would not hesitate to arm. On the other hand I've had crew I wouldn't trust with a needle gun, much less a machine gun.

K.C.

The U.S. Coast Guard Role in Law Enforcement and Piracy

RADM Salerno, the Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship
Ryan Erickson has a informative post at The Unofficial CG Blog, Dealing with Piracy, the Coast Guards on it about U.S.C.G. RADM Salerno's testimony to the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security. I posted on this earlier but Erickson has some good insider info on the Coast Guard's role to

“Deter, disrupt, and suppress piracy in order to support UN Security Council resolutions, protect global maritime commerce, prevent future attacks, enhance maritime security, and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.”

I'll be keeping tabs on this story, my post with previous experience transiting the GoA is here: Escorts for Group Transits about the lack of response from various organizations.

K.C.

Practices to Deter Piracy on a PCTC

A PCTC in NY Harbor
With regards to piracy attacks, a PCTC (Pure Car Truck Carrier) does not fit into the most vulnerable category of ships, those with low freeboards and traveling at low speeds, the so called "low and slow". Car ships generally are capable of 18 kts or more and have high freeboards. However taking into account the consequences of a successful takeover by pirates of an American flag PCTC manned by Americans and with U.S. Government cargo aboard, standard risk assessment doctrine requires that steps be taken to mitigate that risk.

The basic philosophy of ship security is (from USCG)

“hardening” merchant shipping targets. Even if such tactics cannot entirely prevent pirate attacks, they may prolong the time it takes for pirate groups operating from small craft to gain control of a target vessel long enough for naval or law enforcement response assets in the area to successfully intervene.

The most vulnerable points can be identified by taking a walk the length of the ship while alongside, the point of view of someone trying to board from a small boat.

In the case of a car ship there are only a few vulnerable points. How these points are best defended depends upon the layout of the ship. A combination of razor wire and well directed fire hoses (lashed so that can be used unmanned) greatly adds to the challenge of boarding a PCTC at sea.

Once at sea I am guided by a publication called "Best management practices to deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia"

K.C.

Discussing Piracy Risk of PCTCs.

A PCTC Alongsside

Risk Assessment consists of an objective evaluation of risk in which assumptions and uncertainties are clearly considered and presented. (Wikipedia) (FAA Risk Assessment here)

I have talked to many people with regard to what the level of risk is involved in a transit of a car ship (PCTC) through the Gulf of Aden and what countermeasures are appropriate. What I have learned is that this is an emotional issue for many people and each persons views seem more related to that persons political outlook and personality then practicality and that the passion with which the views are held and how vigorously they express those view is not related to that persons level of expertise.

I am not just talking about laymen, the views of ship's captains are all over the map as well. My view is that the risk should be evaluated the same as other risks the ship must contend with such as fire, collision, grounding, labor troubles, weather and so on. (and on and on)

In the case of a piracy attack on a PCTC running at full speed I believe we are dealing with a risk with a large potential loss and a low probability of occurring. Appropriate countermeasures should be evaluated using cost and benefits analysis. Issues with regards to the use of deadly force and the use of lethal vs non-lethal weapons should be resolved at company level and shipboard discussions are generally not worthwhile nor are they particularly enlightening.

When I encounter a person who knows very little about the reality of the situation, assumes that I have no understanding and is determined to educate me, I change the subject and offer them a cup of coffee




K.C.

Escorts for Group Transits

When I think convoy, the picture below is what comes to mind:

WWI Convoy However if you are transiting the Gulf of Aden using the Group Transit system what you see might look more like this:

Group Transit Escort (Photo by KC) Go ahead, zoom in, ain't nothing there.

Whats the deal? According to The Journal of Commerce article Facing Down Piracy:

The group transits,.......... are like convoys but are not escorted by naval ships, which remain “out of sight” over the horizon but still “handy” enough to reach the groups when the pirates hail them.

Ok, "out of sight" but "handy", fair enough, you can't see any ships but you know they are there, just out of sight. But here's the thing, how do I know someone is there?

During my transits of the Gulf of Aden I receive no information at all regarding military assets available for protection. In fact the response I get to my numerous reports is ....NOTHING, not even so much as an automatically generated email, something along the lines of "your call is important to us", I mean nothing, not a single message or email even acknowledging that I exist, let alone that I am transiting the GoA.

I am required to send in numerous messages and reports when I transit, expected arrival times at various points, 24 hr AMVER reports, 8 hr position reports to UKMTO, report to MARAD, noon reports to various parties with ETAs and ETDs to various points, time to enter IRTC (International Recognized Transit Corridor) time to leave, lists of intended waypoints, list of port calls with estimated arrival and departure times. I have to make various initial reports, updates, noon positions and final reports.

I find myself transiting the Gulf of Aden wondering if any one is even receiving my reports, let alone reading them.

It is discouraging to expend time and energy sorting though the voluminous memos, reports, navigation warnings and instructions in order to correctly (I hope) send the proper reports at the correct time and not receive any feedback. I am sometimes tempted to stop sending the required reports to see if I get a reaction.

In more practical terms, an important factor in my planned response to an attack is the expected response time for assistance. If I only need to hold out 30 minutes my response would differ if I need to hold our for a couple of hours or more. Expected response time at any given time during the transit or even in which direction from which I can expect help is something I would like to know. I often don't know if I am even within VHF range of assistance.

K.C.

Bulk Carrier in Group Transit Taken - Car Ship Chased

From EagleSpeak (in comments)

German bulk carrier hijacked in the Gulf of Aden
05/05/2009 18.46 GMT

A German owned and German managed bulk carrier this afternoon was hijacked in the Gulf of Aden in a position approximately 120 nautical miles north of Boosaaso in Somalia (1322N 04923E). The vessel, carrying a load of 10.000 tons of rice, was sailing in the transit corridor and was picked out of a group transit within only a few minutes. A helicopter from the closest warship was too late to prevent the ship from being hijacked. The crew of 11 sailors is believed to be unhurt.

05/05/2009 11.27 GMT
Pirate Attack
Somali Basin (02 38S,053 49E)
Two skiffs chased a vehicle carrier underway and attempted to board her several times. Vessel made evasive manoeuvres and escaped from the pirates. The skiffs aborted the attempt. All vessels are advised to remain vigilant.

Fairplay article here

Vehicle Carrier usually refers to a car ship or PCTC

K.C.

Arming Senior Officers

Kennebec Captain (QM3) fires off a few rounds - M2 Browning .50 Caliber Machine Gun (photo 1977 Aleutian Islands)

Capt. Richard Phillips is in front of congress advocating that senior shipboard officers be armed, while his boss, Maersk Inc. Chairman John P. Clancey, sitting next to him, disagrees. Rescued captain advises Congress on piracy

Or at least disagrees in absolute terms, in relative terms they are in agreement, don't arm my subordinates, or at least not anyone beyond my immediate subordinates.

I know Capt Phillips, he's a good, tough seaman, and, as we know, a brave man.

Having said that, I am familiar with this philosophy - the only crew you can trust to get things done is the Chief Engineer, the first and the mate. The problem is that when an emergency strikes, the senior officers will have their hands full.

I say in for a penny in for a pound. If your going to arm your crews arm them, don't take half way measures that limits the effectiveness in an emergency.

K.C.

My post, Arming Merchant Crews - here